Daily Papers

In this paper, we present novel synthetic training data called self-blended images (SBIs) to detect deepfakes. SBIs are generated by blending pseudo source and target images from single pristine images, reproducing common forgery artifacts (e.g., blending boundaries and statistical inconsistencies between source and target images). The key idea behind SBIs is that more general and hardly recognizable fake samples encourage classifiers to learn generic and robust representations without overfitting to manipulation-specific artifacts. We compare our approach with state-of-the-art methods on FF++, CDF, DFD, DFDC, DFDCP, and FFIW datasets by following the standard cross-dataset and cross-manipulation protocols. Extensive experiments show that our method improves the model generalization to unknown manipulations and scenes. In particular, on DFDC and DFDCP where existing methods suffer from the domain gap between the training and test sets, our approach outperforms the baseline by 4.90% and 11.78% points in the cross-dataset evaluation, respectively.

The increasing integration of AI agents into cyber-physical systems (CPS) introduces new security risks that extend beyond traditional cyber or physical threat models. Recent advances in generative AI enable deepfake and semantic manipulation attacks that can compromise agent perception, reasoning, and interaction with the physical environment, while emerging protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) further expand the attack surface through dynamic tool use and cross-domain context sharing. This survey provides a comprehensive review of security threats targeting AI agents in CPS, with a particular focus on environmental interactions, deepfake-driven attacks, and MCP-mediated vulnerabilities. We organize the literature using the SENTINEL framework, a lifecycle-aware methodology that integrates threat characterization, feasibility analysis under CPS constraints, defense selection, and continuous validation. Through an end-to-end case study grounded in a real-world smart grid deployment, we quantitatively illustrate how timing, noise, and false-positive costs constrain deployable defenses, and why detection mechanisms alone are insufficient as decision authorities in safety-critical CPS. The survey highlights the role of provenance- and physics-grounded trust mechanisms and defense-in-depth architectures, and outlines open challenges toward trustworthy AI-enabled CPS.

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

The emergence of multimodal large language models has redefined the agent paradigm by integrating language and vision modalities with external data sources, enabling agents to better interpret human instructions and execute increasingly complex tasks. However, in this paper, we identify a critical yet previously overlooked security vulnerability in multimodal agents: cross-modal prompt injection attacks. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose CrossInject, a novel attack framework in which attackers embed adversarial perturbations across multiple modalities to align with target malicious content, allowing external instructions to hijack the agent's decision-making process and execute unauthorized tasks. Our approach incorporates two key coordinated components. First, we introduce Visual Latent Alignment, where we optimize adversarial features to the malicious instructions in the visual embedding space based on a text-to-image generative model, ensuring that adversarial images subtly encode cues for malicious task execution. Subsequently, we present Textual Guidance Enhancement, where a large language model is leveraged to construct the black-box defensive system prompt through adversarial meta prompting and generate an malicious textual command that steers the agent's output toward better compliance with attackers' requests. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attacks, achieving at least a +30.1% increase in attack success rates across diverse tasks. Furthermore, we validate our attack's effectiveness in real-world multimodal autonomous agents, highlighting its potential implications for safety-critical applications.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) with multimodal reasoning capabilities are high-value attack targets, given their potential for handling complex multimodal harmful tasks. Mainstream black-box jailbreak attacks on VLMs work by distributing malicious clues across modalities to disperse model attention and bypass safety alignment mechanisms. However, these adversarial attacks rely on simple and fixed image-text combinations that lack attack complexity scalability, limiting their effectiveness for red-teaming VLMs' continuously evolving reasoning capabilities. We propose CrossTALK (\underline{Cross}-modal en\underline{TA}ng\underline{L}ement attac\underline{K}), which is a scalable approach that extends and entangles information clues across modalities to exceed VLMs' trained and generalized safety alignment patterns for jailbreak. Specifically, {knowledge-scalable reframing} extends harmful tasks into multi-hop chain instructions, {cross-modal clue entangling} migrates visualizable entities into images to build multimodal reasoning links, and {cross-modal scenario nesting} uses multimodal contextual instructions to steer VLMs toward detailed harmful outputs. Experiments show our COMET achieves state-of-the-art attack success rate.

The emergence of agent-to-agent communication protocols mirrors the early internet: powerful connectivity with minimal security infrastructure. When AI agents communicate on behalf of users, every message crosses a trust boundary where the user's personal data and the external agent's unconstrained language each present distinct risks. We address both through a dual-firewall architecture grounded in a unifying principle: each task defines a context, and both sides of the communication carry information far exceeding what that context requires. Our firewalls act as projections onto the task context, allowing only contextually appropriate content to cross each boundary. The Language Converter Firewall projects incoming messages onto a closed, domain-specific, structured protocol; an external agent's message is converted to validated fields while persuasive framing, urgency tactics, and embedded instructions are structurally eliminated through deterministic verification. This replaces the asymmetric challenge of resisting every possible manipulation with the structural guarantee that manipulation has no channel through which to arrive. The Data Abstraction Firewall projects outgoing information onto the granularity appropriate for the task, rather than applying binary disclose-or-redact filtering, as previous airgapping solutions did. Both firewalls operate in a trusted environment isolated from external input, applying domain-specific rules learned automatically from demonstrations. Across 864 attacks spanning three domains on the ConVerse benchmark, our architecture reduces privacy attack success rates (e.g., from 84% to 10% for GPT-5) and security attacks (from 60% to 3%), while maintaining or even improving task completion quality.

Learning from demonstrations has shown to be an effective approach to robotic manipulation, especially with the recently collected large-scale robot data with teleoperation systems. Building an efficient teleoperation system across diverse robot platforms has become more crucial than ever. However, there is a notable lack of cost-effective and user-friendly teleoperation systems for different end-effectors, e.g., anthropomorphic robot hands and grippers, that can operate across multiple platforms. To address this issue, we develop ACE, a cross-platform visual-exoskeleton system for low-cost dexterous teleoperation. Our system utilizes a hand-facing camera to capture 3D hand poses and an exoskeleton mounted on a portable base, enabling accurate real-time capture of both finger and wrist poses. Compared to previous systems, which often require hardware customization according to different robots, our single system can generalize to humanoid hands, arm-hands, arm-gripper, and quadruped-gripper systems with high-precision teleoperation. This enables imitation learning for complex manipulation tasks on diverse platforms.

Dexterous hands exhibit significant potential for complex real-world grasping tasks. While recent studies have primarily focused on learning policies for specific robotic hands, the development of a universal policy that controls diverse dexterous hands remains largely unexplored. In this work, we study the learning of cross-embodiment dexterous grasping policies using reinforcement learning (RL). Inspired by the capability of human hands to control various dexterous hands through teleoperation, we propose a universal action space based on the human hand's eigengrasps. The policy outputs eigengrasp actions that are then converted into specific joint actions for each robot hand through a retargeting mapping. We simplify the robot hand's proprioception to include only the positions of fingertips and the palm, offering a unified observation space across different robot hands. Our approach demonstrates an 80% success rate in grasping objects from the YCB dataset across four distinct embodiments using a single vision-based policy. Additionally, our policy exhibits zero-shot generalization to two previously unseen embodiments and significant improvement in efficient finetuning. For further details and videos, visit our project page https://sites.google.com/view/crossdex.

Transfer learning is a popular method for tuning pretrained (upstream) models for different downstream tasks using limited data and computational resources. We study how an adversary with control over an upstream model used in transfer learning can conduct property inference attacks on a victim's tuned downstream model. For example, to infer the presence of images of a specific individual in the downstream training set. We demonstrate attacks in which an adversary can manipulate the upstream model to conduct highly effective and specific property inference attacks (AUC score > 0.9), without incurring significant performance loss on the main task. The main idea of the manipulation is to make the upstream model generate activations (intermediate features) with different distributions for samples with and without a target property, thus enabling the adversary to distinguish easily between downstream models trained with and without training examples that have the target property. Our code is available at https://github.com/yulongt23/Transfer-Inference.

Large-scale endeavors like and widespread community efforts such as Open-X-Embodiment have contributed to growing the scale of robot demonstration data. However, there is still an opportunity to improve the quality, quantity, and diversity of robot demonstration data. Although vision-language models have been shown to automatically generate demonstration data, their utility has been limited to environments with privileged state information, they require hand-designed skills, and are limited to interactions with few object instances. We propose Manipulate-Anything, a scalable automated generation method for real-world robotic manipulation. Unlike prior work, our method can operate in real-world environments without any privileged state information, hand-designed skills, and can manipulate any static object. We evaluate our method using two setups. First, Manipulate-Anything successfully generates trajectories for all 7 real-world and 14 simulation tasks, significantly outperforming existing methods like VoxPoser. Second, Manipulate-Anything's demonstrations can train more robust behavior cloning policies than training with human demonstrations, or from data generated by VoxPoser, Scaling-up, and Code-As-Policies. We believe Manipulate-Anything can be a scalable method for both generating data for robotics and solving novel tasks in a zero-shot setting. Project page: https://robot-ma.github.io/.

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.

Multi-server MCP agents create an information-flow control problem: faithful tool composition can turn individually benign read/write permissions into cross-boundary credential propagation -- a structural side effect of workflow topology, not necessarily malicious model behavior. We present MCPHunt, to our knowledge the first controlled benchmark that isolates non-adversarial, verbatim credential propagation across multi-server MCP trust boundaries, with three methodological contributions: (1) canary-based taint tracking that reduces propagation detection to objective string matching; (2) an environment-controlled coverage design with risky, benign, and hard-negative conditions that validates pipeline soundness and controls for credential-format confounds; (3) CRS stratification that disentangles task-mandated propagation (faithful execution of verbatim-transfer instructions) from policy-violating propagation (credentials included despite the option to redact). Across 3,615 main-benchmark traces from 5 models spanning 147 tasks and 9 mechanism families, policy-violating propagation rates reach 11.5--41.3% across all models. This propagation is pathway-specific (25x cross-mechanism range) and concentrated in browser-mediated data flows; hard-negative controls provide evidence that production-format credentials are not necessary -- prompt-directed cross-boundary data flow is sufficient. A prompt-mitigation study across 3 models reduces policy-violating propagation by up to 97% while preserving 80.5% utility, but effectiveness varies with instruction-following capability -- suggesting that prompt-level defenses alone may not suffice. Code, traces, and labeling pipeline are released under MIT and CC BY 4.0.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) represents a significant advancement in AI-tool integration, enabling seamless communication between AI agents and external services. However, this connectivity introduces novel attack vectors that remain largely unexplored. This paper demonstrates how unsophisticated threat actors, requiring only basic programming skills and free web tools, can exploit MCP's trust model to exfiltrate sensitive financial data. We present a proof-of-concept attack where a malicious weather MCP server, disguised as benign functionality, discovers and exploits legitimate banking tools to steal user account balances. The attack chain requires no advanced technical knowledge, server infrastructure, or monetary investment. The findings reveal a critical security gap in the emerging MCP ecosystem: while individual servers may appear trustworthy, their combination creates unexpected cross-server attack surfaces. Unlike traditional cybersecurity threats that assume sophisticated adversaries, our research shows that the barrier to entry for MCP-based attacks is alarmingly low. A threat actor with undergraduate-level Python knowledge can craft convincing social engineering attacks that exploit the implicit trust relationships MCP establishes between AI agents and tool providers. This work contributes to the nascent field of MCP security by demonstrating that current MCP implementations allow trivial cross-server attacks and proposing both immediate mitigations and protocol improvements to secure this emerging ecosystem.

Our interest is in the design of software systems involving a human-expert interacting -- using natural language -- with a large language model (LLM) on data analysis tasks. For complex problems, it is possible that LLMs can harness human expertise and creativity to find solutions that were otherwise elusive. On one level, this interaction takes place through multiple turns of prompts from the human and responses from the LLM. Here we investigate a more structured approach based on an abstract protocol described in [3] for interaction between agents. The protocol is motivated by a notion of "two-way intelligibility" and is modelled by a pair of communicating finite-state machines. We provide an implementation of the protocol, and provide empirical evidence of using the implementation to mediate interactions between an LLM and a human-agent in two areas of scientific interest (radiology and drug design). We conduct controlled experiments with a human proxy (a database), and uncontrolled experiments with human subjects. The results provide evidence in support of the protocol's capability of capturing one- and two-way intelligibility in human-LLM interaction; and for the utility of two-way intelligibility in the design of human-machine systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/karannb/interact.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

Handheld data collection systems, such as the Universal Manipulation Interface (UMI), enable scalable data collection across diverse environments but only capture observed actions rather than the desired actions executed by a robot controller. In contrast, teleoperation captures desired actions directly, but is prohibitively time-consuming to collect. We revisit this trade-off through the lens of action validity across task phases. We observe that handheld trajectories provide valid supervision in tolerant, free-space phases, but lack dynamic feasibility in contact-sensitive phases, where tracking observed trajectories at high stiffness produces large, unsafe contact forces. We study the interaction between these two supervision types for contact-rich manipulation and find that training policies that combine handheld data with a small number of targeted teleoperated demonstrations provide an efficient hybrid strategy. Specifically, rather than teleoperating the entire task, we only collect partial teleoperated demonstrations for task segments where base handheld policies fail. However, naively mixing handheld and teleoperated phase-specific data yields worse performance than training on handheld data alone. To address this mismatch between observed and desired supervision, we propose Bi-modal Routing for Imitation Data via Gated Experts (BRIDGE), a mixture of diffusion policy experts that routes between specialist task phase heads conditioned on the current robot state. Notably, our approach enables task-phase specific use of desired actions during contact sensitive segments and improves success rates over handheld-only baselines by up to 36.7% across three contact-rich manipulation tasks.

To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) was proposed and has since been widely adopted. However, integrating external tools expands the attack surface, exposing agents to tool poisoning attacks. In such attacks, malicious instructions embedded in tool metadata are injected into the agent context during MCP registration phase, thereby manipulating agent behavior. Prior work primarily focuses on explicit tool poisoning or relied on manually crafted poisoned tools. In contrast, we focus on a particularly stealthy variant: implicit tool poisoning, where the poisoned tool itself remains uninvoked. Instead, the instructions embedded in the tool metadata induce the agent to invoke a legitimate but high-privilege tool to perform malicious operations. We propose MCP-ITP, the first automated and adaptive framework for implicit tool poisoning within the MCP ecosystem. MCP-ITP formulates poisoned tool generation as a black-box optimization problem and employs an iterative optimization strategy that leverages feedback from both an evaluation LLM and a detection LLM to maximize Attack Success Rate (ASR) while evading current detection mechanisms. Experimental results on the MCPTox dataset across 12 LLM agents demonstrate that MCP-ITP consistently outperforms the manually crafted baseline, achieving up to 84.2% ASR while suppressing the Malicious Tool Detection Rate (MDR) to as low as 0.3%.

By providing a standardized interface for LLM agents to interact with external tools, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is quickly becoming a cornerstone of the modern autonomous agent ecosystem. However, it creates novel attack surfaces due to untrusted external tools. While prior work has focused on attacks injected through external tool outputs, we investigate a more fundamental vulnerability: Tool Poisoning, where malicious instructions are embedded within a tool's metadata without execution. To date, this threat has been primarily demonstrated through isolated cases, lacking a systematic, large-scale evaluation. We introduce MCPTox, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate agent robustness against Tool Poisoning in realistic MCP settings. MCPTox is constructed upon 45 live, real-world MCP servers and 353 authentic tools. To achieve this, we design three distinct attack templates to generate a comprehensive suite of 1312 malicious test cases by few-shot learning, covering 10 categories of potential risks. Our evaluation on 20 prominent LLM agents setting reveals a widespread vulnerability to Tool Poisoning, with o1-mini, achieving an attack success rate of 72.8\%. We find that more capable models are often more susceptible, as the attack exploits their superior instruction-following abilities. Finally, the failure case analysis reveals that agents rarely refuse these attacks, with the highest refused rate (Claude-3.7-Sonnet) less than 3\%, demonstrating that existing safety alignment is ineffective against malicious actions that use legitimate tools for unauthorized operation. Our findings create a crucial empirical baseline for understanding and mitigating this widespread threat, and we release MCPTox for the development of verifiably safer AI agents. Our dataset is available at an anonymized repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AAAI26-7C02.

Current alignment evaluation mostly measures whether models encode dangerous concepts and whether they refuse harmful requests. Both miss the layer where alignment often operates: routing from concept detection to behavioral policy. We study political censorship in Chinese-origin language models as a natural experiment, using probes, surgical ablations, and behavioral tests across nine open-weight models from five labs. Three findings follow. First, probe accuracy alone is non-diagnostic: political probes, null controls, and permutation baselines can all reach 100%, so held-out category generalization is the informative test. Second, surgical ablation reveals lab-specific routing. Removing the political-sensitivity direction eliminates censorship and restores accurate factual output in most models tested, while one model confabulates because its architecture entangles factual knowledge with the censorship mechanism. Cross-model transfer fails, indicating that routing geometry is model- and lab-specific. Third, refusal is no longer the dominant censorship mechanism. Within one model family, hard refusal falls to zero while narrative steering rises to the maximum, making censorship invisible to refusal-only benchmarks. These results support a three-stage descriptive framework: detect, route, generate. Models often retain the relevant knowledge; alignment changes how that knowledge is expressed. Evaluations that audit only detection or refusal therefore miss the routing mechanism that most directly determines behavior.

Generalizable manipulation skills, which can be composed to tackle long-horizon and complex daily chores, are one of the cornerstones of Embodied AI. However, existing benchmarks, mostly composed of a suite of simulatable environments, are insufficient to push cutting-edge research works because they lack object-level topological and geometric variations, are not based on fully dynamic simulation, or are short of native support for multiple types of manipulation tasks. To this end, we present ManiSkill2, the next generation of the SAPIEN ManiSkill benchmark, to address critical pain points often encountered by researchers when using benchmarks for generalizable manipulation skills. ManiSkill2 includes 20 manipulation task families with 2000+ object models and 4M+ demonstration frames, which cover stationary/mobile-base, single/dual-arm, and rigid/soft-body manipulation tasks with 2D/3D-input data simulated by fully dynamic engines. It defines a unified interface and evaluation protocol to support a wide range of algorithms (e.g., classic sense-plan-act, RL, IL), visual observations (point cloud, RGBD), and controllers (e.g., action type and parameterization). Moreover, it empowers fast visual input learning algorithms so that a CNN-based policy can collect samples at about 2000 FPS with 1 GPU and 16 processes on a regular workstation. It implements a render server infrastructure to allow sharing rendering resources across all environments, thereby significantly reducing memory usage. We open-source all codes of our benchmark (simulator, environments, and baselines) and host an online challenge open to interdisciplinary researchers.

Agentic AI systems built around large language models (LLMs) are moving away from closed, single-model frameworks and toward open ecosystems that connect a variety of agents, external tools, and resources. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standard to unify tool access, allowing agents to discover, invoke, and coordinate with tools more flexibly. However, as MCP becomes more widely adopted, it also brings a new set of security and privacy challenges. These include risks such as unauthorized access, tool poisoning, prompt injection, privilege escalation, and supply chain attacks, any of which can impact different parts of the protocol workflow. While recent research has examined possible attack surfaces and suggested targeted countermeasures, there is still a lack of systematic, protocol-level security improvements for MCP. To address this, we introduce the Secure Model Context Protocol (SMCP), which builds on MCP by adding unified identity management, robust mutual authentication, ongoing security context propagation, fine-grained policy enforcement, and comprehensive audit logging. In this paper, we present the main components of SMCP, explain how it helps reduce security risks, and illustrate its application with practical examples. We hope that this work will contribute to the development of agentic systems that are not only powerful and adaptable, but also secure and dependable.

The rapid development of the AI agent communication protocols, including the Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent2Agent (A2A), Agora, and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), is reshaping how AI agents communicate with tools, services, and each other. While these protocols support scalable multi-agent interaction and cross-organizational interoperability, their security principles remain understudied, and standardized threat modeling is limited; no protocol-centric risk assessment framework has been established yet. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of four emerging AI agent communication protocols. First, we develop a structured threat modeling analysis that examines protocol architectures, trust assumptions, interaction patterns, and lifecycle behaviors to identify protocol-specific and cross-protocol risk surfaces. Second, we introduce a qualitative risk assessment framework that identifies twelve protocol-level risks and evaluates security posture across the creation, operation, and update phases through systematic assessment of likelihood, impact, and overall protocol risk, with implications for secure deployment and future standardization. Third, we provide a measurement-driven case study on MCP that formalizes the risk of missing mandatory validation/attestation for executable components as a falsifiable security claim by quantifying wrong-provider tool execution under multi-server composition across representative resolver policies. Collectively, our results highlight key design-induced risk surfaces and provide actionable guidance for secure deployment and future standardization of agent communication ecosystems.

We explore Cross-lingual Backdoor ATtacks (X-BAT) in multilingual Large Language Models (mLLMs), revealing how backdoors inserted in one language can automatically transfer to others through shared embedding spaces. Using toxicity classification as a case study, we demonstrate that attackers can compromise multilingual systems by poisoning data in a single language, with rare tokens serving as specific effective triggers. Our findings expose a critical vulnerability in the fundamental architecture that enables cross-lingual transfer in these models. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/himanshubeniwal/X-BAT.

AI-agent guardrails are memoryless: each message is judged in isolation, so an adversary who spreads a single attack across dozens of sessions slips past every session-bound detector because only the aggregate carries the payload. We make three contributions to cross-session threat detection. (1) Dataset. CSTM-Bench is 26 executable attack taxonomies classified by kill-chain stage and cross-session operation (accumulate, compose, launder, inject_on_reader), each bound to one of seven identity anchors that ground-truth "violation" as a policy predicate, plus matched Benign-pristine and Benign-hard confounders. Released on Hugging Face as intrinsec-ai/cstm-bench with two 54-scenario splits: dilution (compositional) and cross_session (12 isolation-invisible scenarios produced by a closed-loop rewriter that softens surface phrasing while preserving cross-session artefacts). (2) Measurement. Framing cross-session detection as an information bottleneck to a downstream correlator LLM, we find that a session-bound judge and a Full-Log Correlator concatenating every prompt into one long-context call both lose roughly half their attack recall moving from dilution to cross_session, well inside any frontier context window. Scope: 54 scenarios per shard, one correlator family (Anthropic Claude), no prompt optimisation; we release it to motivate larger, multi-provider datasets. (3) Algorithm and metric. A bounded-memory Coreset Memory Reader retaining highest-signal fragments at K=50 is the only reader whose recall survives both shards. Because ranker reshuffles break KV-cache prefix reuse, we promote CSR_prefix (ordered prefix stability, LLM-free) to a first-class metric and fuse it with detection into CSTM = 0.7 F_1(CSDA@action, precision) + 0.3 CSR_prefix, benchmarking rankers on a single Pareto of recall versus serving stability.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) defines a schema bound execution model for agent-tool interaction, enabling modular computer vision workflows without retraining. To our knowledge, this is the first protocol level, deployment scale audit of MCP in vision systems, identifying systemic weaknesses in schema semantics, interoperability, and runtime coordination. We analyze 91 publicly registered vision centric MCP servers, annotated along nine dimensions of compositional fidelity, and develop an executable benchmark with validators to detect and categorize protocol violations. The audit reveals high prevalence of schema format divergence, missing runtime schema validation, undeclared coordinate conventions, and reliance on untracked bridging scripts. Validator based testing quantifies these failures, with schema format checks flagging misalignments in 78.0 percent of systems, coordinate convention checks detecting spatial reference errors in 24.6 percent, and memory scope checks issuing an average of 33.8 warnings per 100 executions. Security probes show that dynamic and multi agent workflows exhibit elevated risks of privilege escalation and untyped tool connections. The proposed benchmark and validator suite, implemented in a controlled testbed and to be released on GitHub, establishes a reproducible framework for measuring and improving the reliability and security of compositional vision workflows.

Mental manipulation is a subtle yet pervasive form of abuse in interpersonal communication, making its detection critical for safeguarding potential victims. However, due to manipulation's nuanced and context-specific nature, identifying manipulative language in complex, multi-turn, and multi-person conversations remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs). To address this gap, we introduce the MultiManip dataset, comprising 220 multi-turn, multi-person dialogues balanced between manipulative and non-manipulative interactions, all drawn from reality shows that mimic real-world scenarios. For manipulative interactions, it includes 11 distinct manipulations depicting real-life scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4o and Llama-3.1-8B, employing various prompting strategies. Despite their capabilities, these models often struggle to detect manipulation effectively. To overcome this limitation, we propose SELF-PERCEPT, a novel, two-stage prompting framework inspired by Self-Perception Theory, demonstrating strong performance in detecting multi-person, multi-turn mental manipulation. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/danushkhanna/self-percept .

We present ASAP, a new framework for detecting and grounding multi-modal media manipulation (DGM4).Upon thorough examination, we observe that accurate fine-grained cross-modal semantic alignment between the image and text is vital for accurately manipulation detection and grounding. While existing DGM4 methods pay rare attention to the cross-modal alignment, hampering the accuracy of manipulation detecting to step further. To remedy this issue, this work targets to advance the semantic alignment learning to promote this task. Particularly, we utilize the off-the-shelf Multimodal Large-Language Models (MLLMs) and Large Language Models (LLMs) to construct paired image-text pairs, especially for the manipulated instances. Subsequently, a cross-modal alignment learning is performed to enhance the semantic alignment. Besides the explicit auxiliary clues, we further design a Manipulation-Guided Cross Attention (MGCA) to provide implicit guidance for augmenting the manipulation perceiving. With the grounding truth available during training, MGCA encourages the model to concentrate more on manipulated components while downplaying normal ones, enhancing the model's ability to capture manipulations. Extensive experiments are conducted on the DGM4 dataset, the results demonstrate that our model can surpass the comparison method with a clear margin.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how large language model (LLM) agents discover, describe, and call external tools. While MCP unlocks broad interoperability, it also enlarges the attack surface by making tools first-class, composable objects with natural-language metadata, and standardized I/O. We present MSB (MCP Security Benchmark), the first end-to-end evaluation suite that systematically measures how well LLM agents resist MCP-specific attacks throughout the full tool-use pipeline: task planning, tool invocation, and response handling. MSB contributes: (1) a taxonomy of 12 attacks including name-collision, preference manipulation, prompt injections embedded in tool descriptions, out-of-scope parameter requests, user-impersonating responses, false-error escalation, tool-transfer, retrieval injection, and mixed attacks; (2) an evaluation harness that executes attacks by running real tools (both benign and malicious) via MCP rather than simulation; and (3) a robustness metric that quantifies the trade-off between security and performance: Net Resilient Performance (NRP). We evaluate nine popular LLM agents across 10 domains and 405 tools, producing 2,000 attack instances. Results reveal the effectiveness of attacks against each stage of MCP. Models with stronger performance are more vulnerable to attacks due to their outstanding tool calling and instruction following capabilities. MSB provides a practical baseline for researchers and practitioners to study, compare, and harden MCP agents. Code: https://github.com/dongsenzhang/MSB

Imitation learning from human demonstrations has shown impressive performance in robotics. However, most results focus on table-top manipulation, lacking the mobility and dexterity necessary for generally useful tasks. In this work, we develop a system for imitating mobile manipulation tasks that are bimanual and require whole-body control. We first present Mobile ALOHA, a low-cost and whole-body teleoperation system for data collection. It augments the ALOHA system with a mobile base, and a whole-body teleoperation interface. Using data collected with Mobile ALOHA, we then perform supervised behavior cloning and find that co-training with existing static ALOHA datasets boosts performance on mobile manipulation tasks. With 50 demonstrations for each task, co-training can increase success rates by up to 90%, allowing Mobile ALOHA to autonomously complete complex mobile manipulation tasks such as sauteing and serving a piece of shrimp, opening a two-door wall cabinet to store heavy cooking pots, calling and entering an elevator, and lightly rinsing a used pan using a kitchen faucet. Project website: https://mobile-aloha.github.io

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a universal standard that enables AI agents to seamlessly connect with external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality. However, while MCP brings notable benefits, it also introduces significant vulnerabilities, such as Tool Poisoning Attacks (TPA), where hidden malicious instructions exploit the sycophancy of large language models (LLMs) to manipulate agent behavior. Despite these risks, current academic research on MCP security remains limited, with most studies focusing on narrow or qualitative analyses that fail to capture the diversity of real-world threats. To address this gap, we present the MCP Attack Library (MCPLIB), which categorizes and implements 31 distinct attack methods under four key classifications: direct tool injection, indirect tool injection, malicious user attacks, and LLM inherent attack. We further conduct a quantitative analysis of the efficacy of each attack. Our experiments reveal key insights into MCP vulnerabilities, including agents' blind reliance on tool descriptions, sensitivity to file-based attacks, chain attacks exploiting shared context, and difficulty distinguishing external data from executable commands. These insights, validated through attack experiments, underscore the urgency for robust defense strategies and informed MCP design. Our contributions include 1) constructing a comprehensive MCP attack taxonomy, 2) introducing a unified attack framework MCPLIB, and 3) conducting empirical vulnerability analysis to enhance MCP security mechanisms. This work provides a foundational framework, supporting the secure evolution of MCP ecosystems.

By integrating Chain-of-Thought(CoT) reasoning, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have demonstrated strong capabilities in robotic manipulation, particularly by improving generalization and interpretability. However, the security of CoT-based reasoning mechanisms remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we show that CoT reasoning introduces a novel attack vector for targeted control hijacking--for example, causing a robot to mistakenly deliver a knife to a person instead of an apple--without modifying the user's instruction. We first provide empirical evidence that CoT strongly governs action generation, even when it is semantically misaligned with the input instructions. Building on this observation, we propose TRAP, the first targeted adversarial attack framework for CoT-reasoning VLA models. TRAP uses an adversarial patch (e.g., a coaster placed on the table) to corrupt intermediate CoT reasoning and hijack the VLA's output. By optimizing the CoT adversarial loss, TRAP induces specific and adversary-defined behaviors. Extensive evaluations across 3 mainstream VLA architectures and 3 CoT reasoning paradigms validate the effectiveness of TRAP. Notably, we implemented the patch by printing it on paper in a real-world setting. Our findings highlight the urgent need to secure CoT reasoning in VLA systems.

Personal AI agents like OpenClaw run with elevated privileges on users' local machines, where a single successful prompt injection can leak credentials, redirect financial transactions, or destroy files. This threat goes well beyond conventional text-level jailbreaks, yet existing safety evaluations fall short: most test models in isolated chat settings, rely on synthetic environments, and do not account for how the agent framework itself shapes safety outcomes. We introduce CLAWSAFETY, a benchmark of 120 adversarial test scenarios organized along three dimensions (harm domain, attack vector, and harmful action type) and grounded in realistic, high-privilege professional workspaces spanning software engineering, finance, healthcare, law, and DevOps. Each test case embeds adversarial content in one of three channels the agent encounters during normal work: workspace skill files, emails from trusted senders, and web pages. We evaluate five frontier LLMs as agent backbones, running 2,520 sandboxed trials across all configurations. Attack success rates (ASR) range from 40\% to 75\% across models and vary sharply by injection vector, with skill instructions (highest trust) consistently more dangerous than email or web content. Action-trace analysis reveals that the strongest model maintains hard boundaries against credential forwarding and destructive actions, while weaker models permit both. Cross-scaffold experiments on three agent frameworks further demonstrate that safety is not determined by the backbone model alone but depends on the full deployment stack, calling for safety evaluation that treats model and framework as joint variables. Code and data will be available at: https://weibowen555.github.io/ClawSafety/.

Learning dexterous manipulation requires demonstrations that preserve fine hand-object interactions while remaining executable at deployment. Existing pipelines either lose deployable dexterity through retargeting or embodiment conversion, or rely on robot-specific teleoperation that is costly to scale and often lacks intuitive, contact-aware control for dexterous data collection. We present RealDexUMI, a wearable universal manipulation interface built around a shared dexterous end-effector module that integrates a lightweight dexterous hand, in-hand vision, and fingertip tactile sensing. A palm-side isomorphic teleoperation glove maps human finger inputs to robot-hand joint commands, enabling real-time, retargeting-free, intuitive, and precise hand control. The shared hand and sensing modules yield zero-gap end-effector data, with matched in-hand observations, tactile signals, contacts, and hand actions between collection and deployment. Across eight real-robot tasks spanning fine-grained, contact-rich, long-horizon, and bimanual manipulation, policies trained on RealDexUMI data achieve an average success rate of 88.75%, generalize to unseen initial poses, and transfer across three embodiments. Website: https://research.beingbeyond.com/realdexumi

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

The availability of large-scale facial databases, together with the remarkable progresses of deep learning technologies, in particular Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), have led to the generation of extremely realistic fake facial content, raising obvious concerns about the potential for misuse. Such concerns have fostered the research on manipulation detection methods that, contrary to humans, have already achieved astonishing results in various scenarios. In this study, we focus on the synthesis of entire facial images, which is a specific type of facial manipulation. The main contributions of this study are four-fold: i) a novel strategy to remove GAN "fingerprints" from synthetic fake images based on autoencoders is described, in order to spoof facial manipulation detection systems while keeping the visual quality of the resulting images; ii) an in-depth analysis of the recent literature in facial manipulation detection; iii) a complete experimental assessment of this type of facial manipulation, considering the state-of-the-art fake detection systems (based on holistic deep networks, steganalysis, and local artifacts), remarking how challenging is this task in unconstrained scenarios; and finally iv) we announce a novel public database, named iFakeFaceDB, yielding from the application of our proposed GAN-fingerprint Removal approach (GANprintR) to already very realistic synthetic fake images. The results obtained in our empirical evaluation show that additional efforts are required to develop robust facial manipulation detection systems against unseen conditions and spoof techniques, such as the one proposed in this study.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

AI agents that execute tasks via tool calls frequently hallucinate results - fabricating tool executions, misstating output counts, or presenting inferences as facts. Recent approaches to verifiable AI inference rely on zero-knowledge proofs, which provide cryptographic guarantees but impose minutes of proving time per query, making them impractical for interactive agents. We propose NabaOS, a lightweight verification framework inspired by Indian epistemology (Nyaya Shastra), which classifies every claim in an LLM response by its epistemic source (pramana): direct tool output (pratyaksha), inference (anumana), external testimony (shabda), absence (abhava), or ungrounded opinion. Our runtime generates HMAC-signed tool execution receipts that the LLM cannot forge, then cross-references claims against these receipts to detect hallucinations in real time. We evaluate on NyayaVerifyBench, a new benchmark of 1,800 agent response scenarios across four languages with injected hallucinations of six types. NabaOS detects 94.2% of fabricated tool references, 87.6% of count misstatements, and 91.3% of false absence claims, with <15ms verification overhead per response. For deep delegation (agents performing multi-step web tasks), our cross-checking protocol catches 78.4% of URL fabrications via independent re-fetching. We compare against five approaches: zkLLM (cryptographic proofs, 180s/query), TOPLOC (locality-sensitive hashing), SPEX (sampling-based proof of execution), tensor commitments, and self-consistency checking. NabaOS achieves the best cost-latency-coverage trade-off for interactive agents: 94.2% coverage at <15ms versus zkLLM's near-perfect coverage at 180,000ms. For interactive agents, practical receipt-based verification provides better cost-benefit than cryptographic proofs, and epistemic classification gives users actionable trust signals rather than binary judgments.

As Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP) models are increasingly adopted for diverse downstream tasks and integrated into large vision-language models (VLMs), their susceptibility to adversarial perturbations has emerged as a critical concern. In this work, we introduce X-Transfer, a novel attack method that exposes a universal adversarial vulnerability in CLIP. X-Transfer generates a Universal Adversarial Perturbation (UAP) capable of deceiving various CLIP encoders and downstream VLMs across different samples, tasks, and domains. We refer to this property as super transferability--a single perturbation achieving cross-data, cross-domain, cross-model, and cross-task adversarial transferability simultaneously. This is achieved through surrogate scaling, a key innovation of our approach. Unlike existing methods that rely on fixed surrogate models, which are computationally intensive to scale, X-Transfer employs an efficient surrogate scaling strategy that dynamically selects a small subset of suitable surrogates from a large search space. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that X-Transfer significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art UAP methods, establishing a new benchmark for adversarial transferability across CLIP models. The code is publicly available in our https://github.com/HanxunH/XTransferBench{GitHub repository}.

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

The rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems has highlighted their impressive capabilities in various applications, such as collaborative problem-solving and autonomous negotiation. However, the security implications of these LLM-based multi-agent systems have not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning the spread of manipulated knowledge. In this paper, we investigate this critical issue by constructing a detailed threat model and a comprehensive simulation environment that mirrors real-world multi-agent deployments in a trusted platform. Subsequently, we propose a novel two-stage attack method involving Persuasiveness Injection and Manipulated Knowledge Injection to systematically explore the potential for manipulated knowledge (i.e., counterfactual and toxic knowledge) spread without explicit prompt manipulation. Our method leverages the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs in handling world knowledge, which can be exploited by attackers to unconsciously spread fabricated information. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our attack method can successfully induce LLM-based agents to spread both counterfactual and toxic knowledge without degrading their foundational capabilities during agent communication. Furthermore, we show that these manipulations can persist through popular retrieval-augmented generation frameworks, where several benign agents store and retrieve manipulated chat histories for future interactions. This persistence indicates that even after the interaction has ended, the benign agents may continue to be influenced by manipulated knowledge. Our findings reveal significant security risks in LLM-based multi-agent systems, emphasizing the imperative need for robust defenses against manipulated knowledge spread, such as introducing ``guardian'' agents and advanced fact-checking tools.

Cross-embodiment imitation learning enables policies trained on specific embodiments to transfer across different robots, unlocking the potential for large-scale imitation learning that is both cost-effective and highly reusable. This paper presents LEGATO, a cross-embodiment imitation learning framework for visuomotor skill transfer across varied kinematic morphologies. We introduce a handheld gripper that unifies action and observation spaces, allowing tasks to be defined consistently across robots. We train visuomotor policies on task demonstrations using this gripper through imitation learning, applying transformation to a motion-invariant space for computing the training loss. Gripper motions generated by the policies are retargeted into high-degree-of-freedom whole-body motions using inverse kinematics for deployment across diverse embodiments. Our evaluations in simulation and real-robot experiments highlight the framework's effectiveness in learning and transferring visuomotor skills across various robots. More information can be found on the project page: https://ut-hcrl.github.io/LEGATO.

Visual manipulation localization (VML) aims to identify tampered regions in images and videos, a task that has become increasingly challenging with the rise of advanced editing tools. Existing methods face two main issues: resolution diversity, where resizing or padding distorts forensic traces and reduces efficiency, and the modality gap, as images and videos often require separate models. To address these challenges, we propose RelayFormer, a unified framework that adapts to varying resolutions and modalities. RelayFormer partitions inputs into fixed-size sub-images and introduces Global-Local Relay (GLR) tokens, which propagate structured context through a global-local relay attention (GLRA) mechanism. This enables efficient exchange of global cues, such as semantic or temporal consistency, while preserving fine-grained manipulation artifacts. Unlike prior methods that rely on uniform resizing or sparse attention, RelayFormer naturally scales to arbitrary resolutions and video sequences without excessive overhead. Experiments across diverse benchmarks demonstrate that RelayFormer achieves state-of-the-art performance with notable efficiency, combining resolution adaptivity without interpolation or excessive padding, unified modeling for both images and videos, and a strong balance between accuracy and computational cost. Code is available at: https://github.com/WenOOI/RelayFormer.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

Teleoperating humanoid robots in a whole-body manner marks a fundamental step toward developing general-purpose robotic intelligence, with human motion providing an ideal interface for controlling all degrees of freedom. Yet, most current humanoid teleoperation systems fall short of enabling coordinated whole-body behavior, typically limiting themselves to isolated locomotion or manipulation tasks. We present the Teleoperated Whole-Body Imitation System (TWIST), a system for humanoid teleoperation through whole-body motion imitation. We first generate reference motion clips by retargeting human motion capture data to the humanoid robot. We then develop a robust, adaptive, and responsive whole-body controller using a combination of reinforcement learning and behavior cloning (RL+BC). Through systematic analysis, we demonstrate how incorporating privileged future motion frames and real-world motion capture (MoCap) data improves tracking accuracy. TWIST enables real-world humanoid robots to achieve unprecedented, versatile, and coordinated whole-body motor skills--spanning whole-body manipulation, legged manipulation, locomotion, and expressive movement--using a single unified neural network controller. Our project website: https://humanoid-teleop.github.io

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

Agent communication protocols are becoming critical infrastructure for large language model (LLM) systems that must use tools, coordinate with other agents, and operate across heterogeneous environments. This work presents a human-inspired perspective on this emerging landscape by organizing agent communication into three layers: communication, syntactic, and semantic. Under this framework, we systematically analyze 18 representative protocols and compare how they support reliable transport, structured interaction, and meaning-level coordination. Our analysis shows a clear imbalance in current protocol design. Most protocols provide increasingly mature support for transport, streaming, schema definition, and lifecycle management, but offer limited protocol-level mechanisms for clarification, context alignment, and verification. As a result, semantic responsibilities are often pushed into prompts, wrappers, or application-specific orchestration logic, creating hidden interoperability and maintenance costs. To make this gap actionable, we further identify major forms of technical debt in today's protocol ecosystem and distill practical guidance for selecting protocols under different deployment settings. We conclude by outlining a research agenda for interoperable, secure, and semantically robust agent ecosystems that move beyond message passing toward shared understanding.

Human videos offer a scalable way to train robot manipulation policies, but lack the action labels needed by standard imitation learning algorithms. Existing cross-embodiment approaches try to map human motion to robot actions, but often fail when the embodiments differ significantly. We propose X-Sim, a real-to-sim-to-real framework that uses object motion as a dense and transferable signal for learning robot policies. X-Sim starts by reconstructing a photorealistic simulation from an RGBD human video and tracking object trajectories to define object-centric rewards. These rewards are used to train a reinforcement learning (RL) policy in simulation. The learned policy is then distilled into an image-conditioned diffusion policy using synthetic rollouts rendered with varied viewpoints and lighting. To transfer to the real world, X-Sim introduces an online domain adaptation technique that aligns real and simulated observations during deployment. Importantly, X-Sim does not require any robot teleoperation data. We evaluate it across 5 manipulation tasks in 2 environments and show that it: (1) improves task progress by 30% on average over hand-tracking and sim-to-real baselines, (2) matches behavior cloning with 10x less data collection time, and (3) generalizes to new camera viewpoints and test-time changes. Code and videos are available at https://portal-cornell.github.io/X-Sim/.

Retargeting human motion to robot poses is a practical approach for teleoperating bimanual humanoid robot arms, but existing methods can be suboptimal and slow, often causing undesirable motion or latency. This is due to optimizing to match robot end-effector to human hand position and orientation, which can also limit the robot's workspace to that of the human. Instead, this paper reframes retargeting as an orientation alignment problem, enabling a closed-form, geometric solution algorithm with an optimality guarantee. The key idea is to align a robot arm to a human's upper and lower arm orientations, as identified from shoulder, elbow, and wrist (SEW) keypoints; hence, the method is called SEW-Mimic. The method has fast inference (3 kHz) on standard commercial CPUs, leaving computational overhead for downstream applications; an example in this paper is a safety filter to avoid bimanual self-collision. The method suits most 7-degree-of-freedom robot arms and humanoids, and is agnostic to input keypoint source. Experiments show that SEW-Mimic outperforms other retargeting methods in computation time and accuracy. A pilot user study suggests that the method improves teleoperation task success. Preliminary analysis indicates that data collected with SEW-Mimic improves policy learning due to being smoother. SEW-Mimic is also shown to be a drop-in way to accelerate full-body humanoid retargeting. Finally, hardware demonstrations illustrate SEW-Mimic's practicality. The results emphasize the utility of SEW-Mimic as a fundamental building block for bimanual robot manipulation and humanoid robot teleoperation.

Foundation models are moving from response generation into operational roles. They plan across steps, call tools, request human input, coordinate with other agents, and increasingly carry responsibility for work that affects customers, claims, code, contracts, and clinical decisions. Production deployments are no longer one human supervising one model. They are multi-human, multi-agent collaborations that cross teams, time zones, and trust boundaries. The technical surface for this collaboration remains weakly specified. When an agent drafts a response and a human edits it before it ships, the moment of human judgement is the most valuable signal in the system. In current practice it is recorded, if at all, in application code, chat threads, ticket comments, and tribal memory. Two protocol standards address adjacent concerns: MCP standardises agent access to tools and data, and A2A standardises agent-to-agent interoperability. Neither defines the shared workspace in which humans and agents perform accountable work together. This paper presents CHAP, the Collaborative Human-Agent Protocol. Under CHAP, the override that used to vanish into a chat thread becomes a structured event carrying a diff, a rationale, and a content hash. The handoff between shifts becomes a portable envelope rather than a pinned message. The human approval of an agent's draft becomes a non-repudiable signed decision that can be replayed years later. The protocol achieves this through a small Core (workspaces, participants, tasks, artefacts, and an append-only evidence log) together with composable profiles that add review, modes, routing, deliberation, handoff, identity, signatures, and transparency-backed audit as deployments require them. Specification, reference implementation, conformance suite, and worked examples are available at: https://github.com/BrightbeamAI/chap

We introduce the Cross Human Motion Diffusion Model (CrossDiff), a novel approach for generating high-quality human motion based on textual descriptions. Our method integrates 3D and 2D information using a shared transformer network within the training of the diffusion model, unifying motion noise into a single feature space. This enables cross-decoding of features into both 3D and 2D motion representations, regardless of their original dimension. The primary advantage of CrossDiff is its cross-diffusion mechanism, which allows the model to reverse either 2D or 3D noise into clean motion during training. This capability leverages the complementary information in both motion representations, capturing intricate human movement details often missed by models relying solely on 3D information. Consequently, CrossDiff effectively combines the strengths of both representations to generate more realistic motion sequences. In our experiments, our model demonstrates competitive state-of-the-art performance on text-to-motion benchmarks. Moreover, our method consistently provides enhanced motion generation quality, capturing complex full-body movement intricacies. Additionally, with a pretrained model,our approach accommodates using in the wild 2D motion data without 3D motion ground truth during training to generate 3D motion, highlighting its potential for broader applications and efficient use of available data resources. Project page: https://wonderno.github.io/CrossDiff-webpage/.

Current digital human studies focusing on lip-syncing and body movement are no longer sufficient to meet the growing industrial demand, while human video generation techniques that support interacting with real-world environments (e.g., objects) have not been well investigated. Despite human hand synthesis already being an intricate problem, generating objects in contact with hands and their interactions presents an even more challenging task, especially when the objects exhibit obvious variations in size and shape. To tackle these issues, we present a novel video Reenactment framework focusing on Human-Object Interaction (HOI) via an adaptive Layout-instructed Diffusion model (Re-HOLD). Our key insight is to employ specialized layout representation for hands and objects, respectively. Such representations enable effective disentanglement of hand modeling and object adaptation to diverse motion sequences. To further improve the generation quality of HOI, we design an interactive textural enhancement module for both hands and objects by introducing two independent memory banks. We also propose a layout adjustment strategy for the cross-object reenactment scenario to adaptively adjust unreasonable layouts caused by diverse object sizes during inference. Comprehensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate that our proposed framework significantly outperforms existing methods. Project page: https://fyycs.github.io/Re-HOLD.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

SCTP is a transport protocol offering features such as multi-homing, multi-streaming, and message-oriented delivery. Its two main implementations were subjected to conformance tests using the PacketDrill tool. Conformance testing is not exhaustive and a recent vulnerability (CVE-2021-3772) showed SCTP is not immune to attacks. Changes addressing the vulnerability were implemented, but the question remains whether other flaws might persist in the protocol design. We study the security of the SCTP design, taking a rigorous approach rooted in formal methods. We create a formal Promela model of SCTP, and define 10 properties capturing the essential protocol functionality based on its RFC specification and consultation with the lead RFC author. Then we show using the Spin model checker that our model satisfies these properties. We define 4 attacker models - Off-Path, where the attacker is an outsider that can spoof the port and IP of a peer; Evil-Server, where the attacker is a malicious peer; Replay, where an attacker can capture and replay, but not modify, packets; and On-Path, where the attacker controls the channel between peers. We modify an attack synthesis tool designed for transport protocols, Korg, to support our SCTP model and four attacker models. We synthesize 14 unique attacks using the attacker models - including the CVE vulnerability in the Off-Path attacker model, 4 attacks in the Evil-Server attacker model, an opportunistic ABORT attack in the Replay attacker model, and eight connection manipulation attacks in the On-Path attacker model. We show that the proposed patch eliminates the vulnerability and does not introduce new ones according to our model and protocol properties. Finally, we identify and analyze an ambiguity in the RFC, which we show can be interpreted insecurely. We propose an erratum and show that it eliminates the ambiguity.

Whole-arm manipulation involves direct contact with the environment while the robot completes a task by distributing contact across multiple links as contacts form, slide, and break. This setting breaks common implicit assumptions in many learning-based manipulation pipelines: arm configuration tightly couples motion and contact forces, contact state is partially observed under occlusion, and purely learned rollouts can become physically inconsistent under distribution shift because many multi-link contact configurations are sparsely represented in the data. To address this, we propose TACTIC (Tactile and Vision Conditioned Contact-Centric Control), a receding-horizon controller for whole-arm manipulation. TACTIC uses a contact-centric hybrid predictive model that combines RGB-D, distributed tactile sensing, and a compact 2D proximity representation. The model couples a learned, action-conditioned latent dynamics model with analytical kinematics through contact Jacobians, enabling rollouts of future contact configurations and interaction forces. TACTIC integrates these rollouts into a sampling-based MPC planner with contact-aware action sampling: contact Jacobian-based projections steer sampled action sequences toward force-modulating directions, and objectives defined over predicted proximity and interaction forces trade task progress against whole-arm force regulation. We evaluate TACTIC in simulation against state-of-the-art model-based and model-free methods, and perform ablations that isolate the contribution of each design choice. TACTIC consistently outperforms other methods. We further demonstrate real-world performance on a robot with distributed tactile sensing across three whole-arm manipulation tasks that require multi-contact trajectories: turning over and repositioning a manikin, and goal-reaching in a 3D dynamic maze. Website: https://emprise.cs.cornell.edu/tactic

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are autonomous systems powered by LLMs, capable of reasoning and planning to solve problems by leveraging a set of tools. However, the integration of multi-tool capabilities in LLM agents introduces challenges in securely managing tools, ensuring their compatibility, handling dependency relationships, and protecting control flows within LLM agent workflows. In this paper, we present the first systematic security analysis of task control flows in multi-tool-enabled LLM agents. We identify a novel threat, Cross-Tool Harvesting and Polluting (XTHP), which includes multiple attack vectors to first hijack the normal control flows of agent tasks, and then collect and pollute confidential or private information within LLM agent systems. To understand the impact of this threat, we developed Chord, a dynamic scanning tool designed to automatically detect real-world agent tools susceptible to XTHP attacks. Our evaluation of 66 real-world tools from the repositories of two major LLM agent development frameworks, LangChain and LlamaIndex, revealed a significant security concern: 75\% are vulnerable to XTHP attacks, highlighting the prevalence of this threat.

Recent years in robotics and imitation learning have shown remarkable progress in training large-scale foundation models by leveraging data across a multitude of embodiments. The success of such policies might lead us to wonder: just how diverse can the robots in the training set be while still facilitating positive transfer? In this work, we study this question in the context of heterogeneous embodiments, examining how even seemingly very different domains, such as robotic navigation and manipulation, can provide benefits when included in the training data for the same model. We train a single goal-conditioned policy that is capable of controlling robotic arms, quadcopters, quadrupeds, and mobile bases. We then investigate the extent to which transfer can occur across navigation and manipulation on these embodiments by framing them as a single goal-reaching task. We find that co-training with navigation data can enhance robustness and performance in goal-conditioned manipulation with a wrist-mounted camera. We then deploy our policy trained only from navigation-only and static manipulation-only data on a mobile manipulator, showing that it can control a novel embodiment in a zero-shot manner. These results provide evidence that large-scale robotic policies can benefit from data collected across various embodiments. Further information and robot videos can be found on our project website http://extreme-cross-embodiment.github.io.

Distributed protocols should be robust to both benign malfunction (e.g. packet loss or delay) and attacks (e.g. message replay) from internal or external adversaries. In this paper we take a formal approach to the automated synthesis of attackers, i.e. adversarial processes that can cause the protocol to malfunction. Specifically, given a formal threat model capturing the distributed protocol model and network topology, as well as the placement, goals, and interface (inputs and outputs) of potential attackers, we automatically synthesize an attacker. We formalize four attacker synthesis problems - across attackers that always succeed versus those that sometimes fail, and attackers that attack forever versus those that do not - and we propose algorithmic solutions to two of them. We report on a prototype implementation called KORG and its application to TCP as a case-study. Our experiments show that KORG can automatically generate well-known attacks for TCP within seconds or minutes.

The rise of generative AI (GenAI) multi-agent systems (MAS) necessitates standardized protocols enabling agents to discover and interact with external tools. However, these protocols introduce new security challenges, particularly; tool squatting; the deceptive registration or representation of tools. This paper analyzes tool squatting threats within the context of emerging interoperability standards, such as Model Context Protocol (MCP) or seamless communication between agents protocols. It introduces a comprehensive Tool Registry system designed to mitigate these risks. We propose a security-focused architecture featuring admin-controlled registration, centralized tool discovery, fine grained access policies enforced via dedicated Agent and Tool Registry services, a dynamic trust scoring mechanism based on tool versioning and known vulnerabilities, and just in time credential provisioning. Based on its design principles, the proposed registry framework aims to effectively prevent common tool squatting vectors while preserving the flexibility and power of multi-agent systems. This work addresses a critical security gap in the rapidly evolving GenAI ecosystem and provides a foundation for secure tool integration in production environments.

The paradigm of agentic AI is shifting from engineered complex workflows to post-training native models. However, existing agents are typically confined to static, predefined action spaces--such as exclusively using APIs, GUI events, or robotic commands. This rigidity limits their adaptability in dynamic environments where the optimal granularity of interaction varies contextually. To bridge this gap, we propose CrossAgent, a unified agentic model that masters heterogeneous action spaces and autonomously selects the most effective interface for each step of a trajectory. We introduce a comprehensive training pipeline that integrates cold-start supervised fine-tuning with a Multi-Turn Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm. This approach enables the agent to learn adaptive action switching--balancing high-level efficiency with low-level precision--without human-specified rules. Extensive experiments on over 800 tasks in the open-world Minecraft environment demonstrate that CrossAgent achieves state-of-the-art performance. By dynamically leveraging the strengths of diverse action spaces, our model significantly outperforms fixed-action baselines, exhibiting superior generalization and efficiency in long-horizon reasoning. All code and models are available at https://github.com/CraftJarvis/OpenHA

Autonomous web agents such as OpenClaw are rapidly moving into high-impact real-world workflows, but their security robustness under live network threats remains insufficiently evaluated. Existing benchmarks mainly focus on static sandbox settings and content-level prompt attacks, which leaves a practical gap for network-layer security testing. In this paper, we present ClawTrap, a MITM-based red-teaming framework for real-world OpenClaw security evaluation. ClawTrap supports diverse and customizable attack forms, including Static HTML Replacement, Iframe Popup Injection, and Dynamic Content Modification, and provides a reproducible pipeline for rule-driven interception, transformation, and auditing. This design lays the foundation for future research to construct richer, customizable MITM attacks and to perform systematic security testing across agent frameworks and model backbones. Our empirical study shows clear model stratification: weaker models are more likely to trust tampered observations and produce unsafe outputs, while stronger models demonstrate better anomaly attribution and safer fallback strategies. These findings indicate that reliable OpenClaw security evaluation should explicitly incorporate dynamic real-world MITM conditions rather than relying only on static sandbox protocols.

We present an approach to learn general robot manipulation priors from 3D hand-object interaction trajectories. We build a framework to use in-the-wild videos to generate sensorimotor robot trajectories. We do so by lifting both the human hand and the manipulated object in a shared 3D space and retargeting human motions to robot actions. Generative modeling on this data gives us a task-agnostic base policy. This policy captures a general yet flexible manipulation prior. We empirically demonstrate that finetuning this policy, with both reinforcement learning (RL) and behavior cloning (BC), enables sample-efficient adaptation to downstream tasks and simultaneously improves robustness and generalizability compared to prior approaches. Qualitative experiments are available at: https://hgaurav2k.github.io/hop/.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

Leveraging human motion data to impart robots with versatile manipulation skills has emerged as a promising paradigm in robotic manipulation. Nevertheless, translating multi-source human hand motions into feasible robot behaviors remains challenging, particularly for robots equipped with multi-fingered dexterous hands characterized by complex, high-dimensional action spaces. Moreover, existing approaches often struggle to produce policies capable of adapting to diverse environmental conditions. In this paper, we introduce HERMES, a human-to-robot learning framework for mobile bimanual dexterous manipulation. First, HERMES formulates a unified reinforcement learning approach capable of seamlessly transforming heterogeneous human hand motions from multiple sources into physically plausible robotic behaviors. Subsequently, to mitigate the sim2real gap, we devise an end-to-end, depth image-based sim2real transfer method for improved generalization to real-world scenarios. Furthermore, to enable autonomous operation in varied and unstructured environments, we augment the navigation foundation model with a closed-loop Perspective-n-Point (PnP) localization mechanism, ensuring precise alignment of visual goals and effectively bridging autonomous navigation and dexterous manipulation. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that HERMES consistently exhibits generalizable behaviors across diverse, in-the-wild scenarios, successfully performing numerous complex mobile bimanual dexterous manipulation tasks. Project Page:https://gemcollector.github.io/HERMES/.

The application of vision-language models (VLMs) has achieved impressive success in various robotics tasks, but there are few explorations for foundation models used in quadruped robot navigation. We introduce Cross Anything System (CAS), an innovative system composed of a high-level reasoning module and a low-level control policy, enabling the robot to navigate across complex 3D terrains and reach the goal position. For high-level reasoning and motion planning, we propose a novel algorithmic system taking advantage of a VLM, with a design of task decomposition and a closed-loop sub-task execution mechanism. For low-level locomotion control, we utilize the Probability Annealing Selection (PAS) method to train a control policy by reinforcement learning. Numerous experiments show that our whole system can accurately and robustly navigate across complex 3D terrains, and its strong generalization ability ensures the applications in diverse indoor and outdoor scenarios and terrains. Project page: https://cross-anything.github.io/

Misinformation has become a pressing issue. Fake media, in both visual and textual forms, is widespread on the web. While various deepfake detection and text fake news detection methods have been proposed, they are only designed for single-modality forgery based on binary classification, let alone analyzing and reasoning subtle forgery traces across different modalities. In this paper, we highlight a new research problem for multi-modal fake media, namely Detecting and Grounding Multi-Modal Media Manipulation (DGM^4). DGM^4 aims to not only detect the authenticity of multi-modal media, but also ground the manipulated content (i.e., image bounding boxes and text tokens), which requires deeper reasoning of multi-modal media manipulation. To support a large-scale investigation, we construct the first DGM^4 dataset, where image-text pairs are manipulated by various approaches, with rich annotation of diverse manipulations. Moreover, we propose a novel HierArchical Multi-modal Manipulation rEasoning tRansformer (HAMMER) to fully capture the fine-grained interaction between different modalities. HAMMER performs 1) manipulation-aware contrastive learning between two uni-modal encoders as shallow manipulation reasoning, and 2) modality-aware cross-attention by multi-modal aggregator as deep manipulation reasoning. Dedicated manipulation detection and grounding heads are integrated from shallow to deep levels based on the interacted multi-modal information. Finally, we build an extensive benchmark and set up rigorous evaluation metrics for this new research problem. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of our model; several valuable observations are also revealed to facilitate future research in multi-modal media manipulation.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin authentication enabling server-side prompt injection, and (3) implicit trust propagation in multi-server configurations. We implement MCPBench, a novel framework bridging existing agent security benchmarks to MCP-compliant infrastructure, enabling direct measurement of protocol-specific attack surfaces. Through controlled experiments on 847 attack scenarios across five MCP server implementations, we demonstrate that MCP's architectural choices amplify attack success rates by 23--41\% compared to equivalent non-MCP integrations. We propose MCPSec, a backward-compatible protocol extension adding capability attestation and message authentication, reducing attack success rates from 52.8\% to 12.4\% with median latency overhead of 8.3ms per message. Our findings establish that MCP's security weaknesses are architectural rather than implementation-specific, requiring protocol-level remediation.

Imitation learning provides a promising approach to dexterous hand manipulation, but its effectiveness is limited by the lack of large-scale, high-fidelity data. Existing data-collection pipelines suffer from inaccurate motion retargeting, low data-collection efficiency, and missing high-resolution fingertip tactile sensing. We address this gap with MILE, a mechanically isomorphic teleoperation and data-collection system co-designed from human hand to exoskeleton to robotic hand. The exoskeleton is anthropometrically derived from the human hand, and the robotic hand preserves one-to-one joint-position isomorphism, eliminating nonlinear retargeting and enabling precise, natural control. The exoskeleton achieves a multi-joint mean absolute angular error below one degree, while the robotic hand integrates compact fingertip visuotactile modules that provide high-resolution tactile observations. Built on this retargeting-free interface, we teleoperate complex, contact-rich in-hand manipulation and efficiently collect a multimodal dataset comprising high-resolution fingertip visuotactile signals, RGB-D images, and joint positions. The teleoperation pipeline achieves a mean success rate improvement of 64%. Incorporating fingertip tactile observations further increases the success rate by an average of 25% over the vision-only baseline, validating the fidelity and utility of the dataset. Further details are available at: https://sites.google.com/view/mile-system.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as judges to evaluate agent performance, particularly in non-verifiable settings where judgments rely on agent trajectories including chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. This paradigm implicitly assumes that the agent's CoT faithfully reflects both its internal reasoning and the underlying environment state. We show this assumption is brittle: LLM judges are highly susceptible to manipulation of agent reasoning traces. By systematically rewriting agent CoTs while holding actions and observations fixed, we demonstrate that manipulated reasoning alone can inflate false positive rates of state-of-the-art VLM judges by up to 90% across 800 trajectories spanning diverse web tasks. We study manipulation strategies spanning style-based approaches that alter only the presentation of reasoning and content-based approaches that fabricate signals of task progress, and find that content-based manipulations are consistently more effective. We evaluate prompting-based techniques and scaling judge-time compute, which reduce but do not fully eliminate susceptibility to manipulation. Our findings reveal a fundamental vulnerability in LLM-based evaluation and highlight the need for judging mechanisms that verify reasoning claims against observable evidence.

The remarkable capability of large language models (LLMs) has led to the wide application of LLM-based agents in various domains. To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, model context protocol (MCP) tools have become the de facto standard and are now widely integrated into these agents. However, the incorporation of MCP tools introduces the risk of tool poisoning attacks, which can manipulate the behavior of LLM-based agents. Although previous studies have identified such vulnerabilities, their red teaming approaches have largely remained at the proof-of-concept stage, leaving the automatic and systematic red teaming of LLM-based agents under the MCP tool poisoning paradigm an open question. To bridge this gap, we propose AutoMalTool, an automated red teaming framework for LLM-based agents by generating malicious MCP tools. Our extensive evaluation shows that AutoMalTool effectively generates malicious MCP tools capable of manipulating the behavior of mainstream LLM-based agents while evading current detection mechanisms, thereby revealing new security risks in these agents.

Teleoperation systems are essential for efficiently collecting diverse and high-quality robot demonstration data, especially for complex, contact-rich tasks. However, current teleoperation platforms typically lack integrated force feedback, cross-embodiment generalization, and portable, user-friendly designs, limiting their practical deployment. To address these limitations, we introduce ACE-F, a cross embodiment foldable teleoperation system with integrated force feedback. Our approach leverages inverse kinematics (IK) combined with a carefully designed human-robot interface (HRI), enabling users to capture precise and high-quality demonstrations effortlessly. We further propose a generalized soft-controller pipeline integrating PD control and inverse dynamics to ensure robot safety and precise motion control across diverse robotic embodiments. Critically, to achieve cross-embodiment generalization of force feedback without additional sensors, we innovatively interpret end-effector positional deviations as virtual force signals, which enhance data collection and enable applications in imitation learning. Extensive teleoperation experiments confirm that ACE-F significantly simplifies the control of various robot embodiments, making dexterous manipulation tasks as intuitive as operating a computer mouse. The system is open-sourced at: https://acefoldable.github.io/

Agent-interoperability protocols such as A2A and MCP standardize what agents say to one another but assume address-based transport. Whether over HTTP(S) or a content-protecting binding such as MLS-based SLIM, these transports protect message content yet leave the communication graph exposed: which agent contacts which, when, and how often. In agent systems this graph is more consequential than a privacy framing suggests. Endpoints are capability-labeled, workflows are structured and chained, and interactions are coupled to real actions, so an observer recovers more than past relationships: it can infer the pending workflow and, at machine speed, act on that inference before the workflow completes. The threat is therefore one of workflow integrity, not privacy alone. We formalize a threat model for the communication graph and locate what makes its metadata distinctively consequential: not stronger fingerprinting, which we measure to be comparable to other machine traffic, but exposure across independent trust domains, coupled to autonomous action. We define transport- and bootstrap-layer privacy properties, evaluate candidate transports, and give an A2A case study where a metadata-protecting binding surfaces the protocol's implicit identity assumptions. On a generative model anchored to a real capture and over a live A2A binding, a label-blind classifier recovers a task's class from passive metadata well above chance, and from only its opening; a defense-aware adversary does not overturn this, and only the full set of properties drives recovery toward chance. The leverage of acting on the leak is distinct from recoverability: under a fixed budget an adversary realizes most of a clairvoyant attacker's advantage from a workflow's opening, governed by precision over the top-ranked workflows rather than overall accuracy, so a defense suppresses it even while recovery stays above chance.

Hand-object motion-capture (MoCap) repositories offer large-scale, contact-rich demonstrations and hold promise for scaling dexterous robotic manipulation. Yet demonstration inaccuracies and embodiment gaps between human and robot hands limit the straightforward use of these data. Existing methods adopt a three-stage workflow, including retargeting, tracking, and residual correction, which often leaves demonstrations underused and compound errors across stages. We introduce Dexplore, a unified single-loop optimization that jointly performs retargeting and tracking to learn robot control policies directly from MoCap at scale. Rather than treating demonstrations as ground truth, we use them as soft guidance. From raw trajectories, we derive adaptive spatial scopes, and train with reinforcement learning to keep the policy in-scope while minimizing control effort and accomplishing the task. This unified formulation preserves demonstration intent, enables robot-specific strategies to emerge, improves robustness to noise, and scales to large demonstration corpora. We distill the scaled tracking policy into a vision-based, skill-conditioned generative controller that encodes diverse manipulation skills in a rich latent representation, supporting generalization across objects and real-world deployment. Taken together, these contributions position Dexplore as a principled bridge that transforms imperfect demonstrations into effective training signals for dexterous manipulation.

The model context protocol (MCP) has been widely adapted as an open standard enabling the seamless integration of generative AI agents. However, recent work has shown the MCP is susceptible to retrieval-based "falsely benign" attacks (FBAs), allowing malicious system access and credential theft, but requiring that users download compromised files directly to their systems. Herein, we show that the threat model of MCP-based attacks is significantly broader than previously thought, i.e., attackers need only post malicious content online to deceive MCP agents into carrying out their attacks on unsuspecting victims' systems. To improve alignment guardrails against such attacks, we introduce a new MCP dataset of FBAs and (truly) benign samples to explore the effectiveness of direct preference optimization (DPO) for the refusal training of large language models (LLMs). While DPO improves model guardrails against such attacks, we show that the efficacy of refusal learning varies drastically depending on the model's original post-training alignment scheme--e.g., GRPO-based LLMs learn to refuse extremely poorly. Thus, to further improve FBA refusals, we introduce Retrieval Augmented Generation for Preference alignment (RAG-Pref), a novel preference alignment strategy based on RAG. We show that RAG-Pref significantly improves the ability of LLMs to refuse FBAs, particularly when combined with DPO alignment, thus drastically improving guardrails against MCP-based attacks.

The free access to large-scale public databases, together with the fast progress of deep learning techniques, in particular Generative Adversarial Networks, have led to the generation of very realistic fake content with its corresponding implications towards society in this era of fake news. This survey provides a thorough review of techniques for manipulating face images including DeepFake methods, and methods to detect such manipulations. In particular, four types of facial manipulation are reviewed: i) entire face synthesis, ii) identity swap (DeepFakes), iii) attribute manipulation, and iv) expression swap. For each manipulation group, we provide details regarding manipulation techniques, existing public databases, and key benchmarks for technology evaluation of fake detection methods, including a summary of results from those evaluations. Among all the aspects discussed in the survey, we pay special attention to the latest generation of DeepFakes, highlighting its improvements and challenges for fake detection. In addition to the survey information, we also discuss open issues and future trends that should be considered to advance in the field.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly emerged as a universal standard for connecting AI assistants to external tools and data sources. While MCP simplifies integration between AI applications and various services, it introduces significant security vulnerabilities, particularly on the client side. In this work we conduct threat modelings of MCP implementations using STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) and DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, Discoverability) frameworks across five key components: (1) MCP Host and Client, (2) LLM, (3) MCP Server, (4) External Data Stores, and (5) Authorization Server. This comprehensive analysis reveals tool poisoning-where malicious instructions are embedded in tool metadata-as the most prevalent and impactful client-side vulnerability. We therefore focus our empirical evaluation on this critical attack vector, providing a systematic comparison of how seven major MCP clients validate and defend against tool poisoning attacks. Our analysis reveals significant security issues with most tested clients due to insufficient static validation and parameter visibility. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy encompassing static metadata analysis, model decision path tracking, behavioral anomaly detection, and user transparency mechanisms. This research addresses a critical gap in MCP security, which has primarily focused on server-side vulnerabilities, and provides actionable recommendations and mitigation strategies for securing AI agent ecosystems.

Web-based agents powered by large language models are increasingly used for tasks such as email management or professional networking. Their reliance on dynamic web content, however, makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: adversarial instructions hidden in interface elements that persuade the agent to divert from its original task. We introduce the Task-Redirecting Agent Persuasion Benchmark (TRAP), a benchmark for studying how persuasion techniques misguide autonomous web agents on realistic tasks. Across six frontier models, agents are susceptible to prompt injection in 25% of tasks on average (13% for GPT-5 to 43% for DeepSeek-R1), with small interface or contextual changes often doubling success rates and revealing systemic, psychologically driven vulnerabilities in web-based agents. We also provide a modular social-engineering injection framework with controlled experiments on high-fidelity website clones, allowing for further benchmark expansion.

We propose PostCam, a framework for novel-view video generation that enables post-capture editing of camera trajectories in dynamic scenes. We find that existing video recapture methods suffer from suboptimal camera motion injection strategies; such suboptimal designs not only limit camera control precision but also result in generated videos that fail to preserve fine visual details from the source video. To achieve more accurate and flexible motion manipulation, PostCam introduces a query-shared cross-attention module. It integrates two distinct forms of control signals: the 6-DoF camera poses and the 2D rendered video frames. By fusing them into a unified representation within a shared feature space, our model can extract underlying motion cues, which enhances both control precision and generation quality. Furthermore, we adopt a two-stage training strategy: the model first learns coarse camera control from pose inputs, and then incorporates visual information to refine motion accuracy and enhance visual fidelity. Experiments on both real-world and synthetic datasets demonstrate that PostCam outperforms state-of-the-art methods by over 20% in camera control precision and view consistency, while achieving the highest video generation quality. Our project webpage is publicly available at: https://cccqaq.github.io/PostCam.github.io/

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated multi-turn manipulation attacks, where adversaries strategically build context through seemingly benign conversational turns to circumvent safety measures and elicit harmful or unauthorized responses. These attacks exploit the temporal nature of dialogue to evade single-turn detection methods, representing a critical security vulnerability with significant implications for real-world deployments. This paper introduces the Temporal Context Awareness (TCA) framework, a novel defense mechanism designed to address this challenge by continuously analyzing semantic drift, cross-turn intention consistency and evolving conversational patterns. The TCA framework integrates dynamic context embedding analysis, cross-turn consistency verification, and progressive risk scoring to detect and mitigate manipulation attempts effectively. Preliminary evaluations on simulated adversarial scenarios demonstrate the framework's potential to identify subtle manipulation patterns often missed by traditional detection techniques, offering a much-needed layer of security for conversational AI systems. In addition to outlining the design of TCA , we analyze diverse attack vectors and their progression across multi-turn conversation, providing valuable insights into adversarial tactics and their impact on LLM vulnerabilities. Our findings underscore the pressing need for robust, context-aware defenses in conversational AI systems and highlight TCA framework as a promising direction for securing LLMs while preserving their utility in legitimate applications. We make our implementation available to support further research in this emerging area of AI security.

AI pentesting agents are increasingly credible as offensive security systems, but current benchmarks still provide limited guidance on which will perform best in real-world targets. Existing evaluation protocols assess and optimize for predefined goals such as capture-the-flag, remote code execution, exploit reproduction, or trajectory similarity, in simplified or narrow settings. These tools are valuable for measuring bounded capabilities, yet they do not adequately capture the complexity, open-ended exploration, and strategic decision-making required in realistic pentesting. In this paper, we present a practical evaluation protocol that shifts assessment from task completion to validated vulnerability discovery, allowing evaluation in sufficiently complex targets spanning multiple attack surfaces and vulnerability classes. The protocol combines structured ground-truth with LLM-based semantic matching to identify vulnerabilities, bipartite resolution to score findings under realistic ambiguity, continuous ground-truth maintenance, repeated and cumulative evaluation of stochastic agents, efficiency metrics, and reduced-suite selection for sustainable experimentation. This protocol extends the state of the art by enabling a more realistic, operationally informative comparison of AI pentesting agents. To enable reproducibility, we also release expert-annotated ground truth and code for the proposed evaluation protocol: https://github.com/ethiack/ethibench.

Activation steering is a popular white-box control technique that modifies model activations to elicit an abstract change in its behavior. It has also become a standard tool in interpretability (e.g., probing truthfulness, or translating activations into human-readable explanations) and safety research (e.g., jailbreakability). However, it is unclear whether steered behavior is realizable by any textual prompt. In this work, we cast this question as a surjectivity problem: for a fixed model, does every steered activation admit a preimage under the model's natural forward pass? Under practical assumptions, we prove that activation steering pushes the residual stream off the manifold of states reachable from discrete prompts. Almost surely, no prompt can reproduce the same internal behavior induced by steering. We also illustrate this finding empirically across three widely used LLMs. Our results establish a formal separation between white-box steerability and black-box prompting. We therefore caution against interpreting the ease and success of activation steering as evidence of prompt-based interpretability or vulnerability, and argue for evaluation protocols that explicitly decouple white-box and black-box interventions.

Large Language Model agents demonstrate potential in solving real-world problems via tools, yet generalist intelligence is bottlenecked by scarce high-quality, long-horizon data. Existing methods collect privacy-constrained API logs or generate scripted interactions lacking diversity, which struggle to produce data requisite for scaling capabilities. We propose AgentSkiller, a fully automated framework synthesizing multi-turn interaction data across realistic, semantically linked domains. It employs a DAG-based architecture with explicit state transitions to ensure determinism and recoverability. The pipeline builds a domain ontology and Person-Centric Entity Graph, defines tool interfaces via Service Blueprints for Model Context Protocol servers, and populates environments with consistent databases and strict Domain Policies. A cross-domain fusion mechanism links services to simulate complex tasks. Finally, the pipeline creates user tasks by verifying solution paths, filtering via execution-based validation, and generating queries using a Persona-based Simulator for automated rollout. This produces reliable environments with clear state changes. To demonstrate effectiveness, we synthesized approx 11K interaction samples; experimental results indicate that models trained on this dataset achieve significant improvements on function calling over baselines, particularly in larger parameter regimes.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standardized interface enabling seamless integration between Large Language Models (LLMs) and external data sources and tools. While MCP significantly reduces development complexity and enhances agent capabilities, its openness and extensibility introduce critical security vulnerabilities that threaten system trustworthiness and user data protection. This paper systematically analyzes the security landscape of MCP-based systems, identifying three principal threat categories: (1) agent hijacking attacks stemming from protocol design deficiencies; (2) traditional web vulnerabilities in MCP servers; and (3) supply chain security. To address these challenges, we comprehensively survey existing defense strategies, examining both proactive server-side scanning approaches, ranging from layered detection pipelines and agentic auditing frameworks to zero-trust registry systems, and runtime interaction monitoring solutions that provide continuous oversight and policy enforcement. Our analysis reveals that MCP security fundamentally represents a paradigm shift where the attack surface extends from traditional code execution to semantic interpretation of natural language metadata, necessitating novel defense mechanisms tailored to this unique threat model.

Egocentric manipulation videos are highly challenging due to severe occlusions during interactions and frequent object entries and exits from the camera view as the person moves. Current methods typically focus on recovering either hand or object pose in isolation, but both struggle during interactions and fail to handle out-of-sight cases. Moreover, their independent predictions often lead to inconsistent hand-object relations. We introduce WHOLE, a method that holistically reconstructs hand and object motion in world space from egocentric videos given object templates. Our key insight is to learn a generative prior over hand-object motion to jointly reason about their interactions. At test time, the pretrained prior is guided to generate trajectories that conform to the video observations. This joint generative reconstruction substantially outperforms approaches that process hands and objects separately followed by post-processing. WHOLE achieves state-of-the-art performance on hand motion estimation, 6D object pose estimation, and their relative interaction reconstruction. Project website: https://judyye.github.io/whole-www

Handheld devices have opened up unprecedented opportunities to collect large-scale, high-quality demonstrations efficiently. However, existing systems often lack robust tactile sensing or reliable pose tracking to handle complex interaction scenarios, especially for bimanual and contact-rich tasks. In this work, we propose ViTaMIn-B, a more capable and efficient handheld data collection system for such tasks. We first design DuoTact, a novel compliant visuo-tactile sensor built with a flexible frame to withstand large contact forces during manipulation while capturing high-resolution contact geometry. To enhance the cross-sensor generalizability, we propose reconstructing the sensor's global deformation as a 3D point cloud and using it as the policy input. We further develop a robust, unified 6-DoF bimanual pose acquisition process using Meta Quest controllers, which eliminates the trajectory drift issue in common SLAM-based methods. Comprehensive user studies confirm the efficiency and high usability of ViTaMIn-B among novice and expert operators. Furthermore, experiments on four bimanual manipulation tasks demonstrate its superior task performance relative to existing systems. Project page: https://chuanyune.github.io/ViTaMIn-B_page/

Object-level manipulation, relocating or reorienting objects in images or videos while preserving scene realism, is central to film post-production, AR, and creative editing. Yet existing methods struggle to jointly achieve three core goals: background preservation, geometric consistency under viewpoint shifts, and user-controllable transformations. Geometry-based approaches offer precise control but require explicit 3D reconstruction and generalize poorly; diffusion-based methods generalize better but lack fine-grained geometric control. We present Ctrl&Shift, an end-to-end diffusion framework to achieve geometry-consistent object manipulation without explicit 3D representations. Our key insight is to decompose manipulation into two stages, object removal and reference-guided inpainting under explicit camera pose control, and encode both within a unified diffusion process. To enable precise, disentangled control, we design a multi-task, multi-stage training strategy that separates background, identity, and pose signals across tasks. To improve generalization, we introduce a scalable real-world dataset construction pipeline that generates paired image and video samples with estimated relative camera poses. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Ctrl&Shift achieves state-of-the-art results in fidelity, viewpoint consistency, and controllability. To our knowledge, this is the first framework to unify fine-grained geometric control and real-world generalization for object manipulation, without relying on any explicit 3D modeling.

Large language models (LLMs) can now access a wide range of external tools, thanks to the Model Context Protocol (MCP). This greatly expands their abilities as various agents. However, LLMs rely entirely on the text descriptions of tools to decide which ones to use--a process that is surprisingly fragile. In this work, we expose a vulnerability in prevalent tool/function-calling protocols by investigating a series of edits to tool descriptions, some of which can drastically increase a tool's usage from LLMs when competing with alternatives. Through controlled experiments, we show that tools with properly edited descriptions receive over 10 times more usage from GPT-4.1 and Qwen2.5-7B than tools with original descriptions. We further evaluate how various edits to tool descriptions perform when competing directly with one another and how these trends generalize or differ across a broader set of 10 different models. These phenomenons, while giving developers a powerful way to promote their tools, underscore the need for a more reliable foundation for agentic LLMs to select and utilize tools and resources.

We present ArtiGrasp, a novel method to synthesize bi-manual hand-object interactions that include grasping and articulation. This task is challenging due to the diversity of the global wrist motions and the precise finger control that are necessary to articulate objects. ArtiGrasp leverages reinforcement learning and physics simulations to train a policy that controls the global and local hand pose. Our framework unifies grasping and articulation within a single policy guided by a single hand pose reference. Moreover, to facilitate the training of the precise finger control required for articulation, we present a learning curriculum with increasing difficulty. It starts with single-hand manipulation of stationary objects and continues with multi-agent training including both hands and non-stationary objects. To evaluate our method, we introduce Dynamic Object Grasping and Articulation, a task that involves bringing an object into a target articulated pose. This task requires grasping, relocation, and articulation. We show our method's efficacy towards this task. We further demonstrate that our method can generate motions with noisy hand-object pose estimates from an off-the-shelf image-based regressor.

Modern interactive video world models have achieved impressive visual fidelity, yet lack fine-grained multi-entity control and cross-entity, cross-world generalization. We trace this gap to the action interface: standard control protocols (e.g. animation IDs, device inputs, scene-level captions) bind action semantics to specific entities or engines at design time. We propose natural language as the interface to unlock expressiveness that no prior interface can achieve, and we present Incantation, the first interactive video world model with per-latent-frame (0.25 s) natural-language conditioning that supports simultaneous multi-entity control and concept-level cross-entity transfer beyond any fixed rendering pipeline. We pair a pretrained bidirectional video backbone with frame-local text cross-attention, and enable real-time long-horizon streaming through ODE-initialized Self-Forcing distillation with a RoPE-decoupled sliding KV-cache. We surpass the Action-Index baseline on cross-entity transfer (89% vs. 43%) and out-of-vocabulary prompts (90% vs. 0%), and our 2-step student sustains 19.7 FPS at 480p with stable FVD over 2-hour rollouts. We further apply the same architecture and training recipe to The King of Fighters, changing only the per-entity action vocabulary slots. We have released a preview subset of the Incantation dataset at https://huggingface.co/datasets/zhush/incantation-elden-ring-scenes, containing manually collected Elden Ring player-boss combat clips with structured action-oriented metadata. Larger-scale Elden Ring and KOF data will be released with the full project.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

Large language model powered autonomous agents demand robust, standardized protocols to integrate tools, share contextual data, and coordinate tasks across heterogeneous systems. Ad-hoc integrations are difficult to scale, secure, and generalize across domains. This survey examines four emerging agent communication protocols: Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent-to-Agent Protocol (A2A), and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), each addressing interoperability in deployment contexts. MCP provides a JSON-RPC client-server interface for secure tool invocation and typed data exchange. ACP defines a general-purpose communication protocol over RESTful HTTP, supporting MIME-typed multipart messages and synchronous and asynchronous interactions. Its lightweight and runtime-independent design enables scalable agent invocation, while features like session management, message routing, and integration with role-based and decentralized identifiers (DIDs). A2A enables peer-to-peer task delegation using capability-based Agent Cards, supporting secure and scalable collaboration across enterprise agent workflows. ANP supports open network agent discovery and secure collaboration using W3C decentralized identifiers DIDs and JSON-LD graphs. The protocols are compared across multiple dimensions, including interaction modes, discovery mechanisms, communication patterns, and security models. Based on the comparative analysis, a phased adoption roadmap is proposed: beginning with MCP for tool access, followed by ACP for structured, multimodal messaging session-aware interaction and both online and offline agent discovery across scalable, HTTP-based deployments A2A for collaborative task execution, and extending to ANP for decentralized agent marketplaces. This work provides a comprehensive foundation for designing secure, interoperable, and scalable ecosystems of LLM-powered agents.

Security of model parameters and user data is critical for Transformer-based services, such as ChatGPT. While recent strides in secure two-party protocols have successfully addressed security concerns in serving Transformer models, their adoption is practically infeasible due to the prohibitive cryptographic overheads involved. Drawing insights from our hands-on experience in developing two real-world Transformer-based services, we identify the inherent efficiency bottleneck in the two-party assumption. To overcome this limitation, we propose a novel three-party threat model. Within this framework, we design a semi-symmetric permutation-based protection scheme and present STIP, the first secure Transformer inference protocol without any inference accuracy loss. Experiments on representative Transformer models in real systems show that STIP has practical security and outperforms state-of-the-art secure two-party protocols in efficiency by millions of times.

Autonomous web agents promise to automate everyday browsing tasks, but inherit one of the web's oldest attack surfaces. Cross-Site Scripting proved that mixing trusted and untrusted content is dangerous, even on benign pages. Agents resurface this risk by interpreting natural language as instructions, allowing third-party and user-generated content to hijack the agent via prompt injection. The core challenge is that deriving a task-specific security policy requires reasoning over page structure that is entangled with the attacker's content. We present Prismata, a defense enforcing contextual least privilege for web agents, constraining both what the agent sees and what it can do. Prismata's dynamic trust derivation produces permission labels for page content, with structural confinement guarantees, inspired by classical integrity models, that bound any labeling errors so that labels can only decrease in privilege and mislabelings are bounded. Prismata's mechanical confinement enforces these labels by redacting content and restricting agent capabilities. Importantly, these mechanisms require no developer annotations, so Prismata supports the long tail of websites. Across recent published web agent attacks, including adaptive variants, Prismata substantially reduces attack success while preserving benign task utility.

Multi-turn interactions with language models (LMs) pose critical safety risks, as harmful intent can be strategically spread across exchanges. Yet, the vast majority of prior work has focused on single-turn safety, while adaptability and diversity remain among the key challenges of multi-turn red-teaming. To address these challenges, we present X-Teaming, a scalable framework that systematically explores how seemingly harmless interactions escalate into harmful outcomes and generates corresponding attack scenarios. X-Teaming employs collaborative agents for planning, attack optimization, and verification, achieving state-of-the-art multi-turn jailbreak effectiveness and diversity with success rates up to 98.1% across representative leading open-weight and closed-source models. In particular, X-Teaming achieves a 96.2% attack success rate against the latest Claude 3.7 Sonnet model, which has been considered nearly immune to single-turn attacks. Building on X-Teaming, we introduce XGuard-Train, an open-source multi-turn safety training dataset that is 20x larger than the previous best resource, comprising 30K interactive jailbreaks, designed to enable robust multi-turn safety alignment for LMs. Our work offers essential tools and insights for mitigating sophisticated conversational attacks, advancing the multi-turn safety of LMs.

The integration of AI agents with Web3 ecosystems harnesses their complementary potential for autonomy and openness yet also introduces underexplored security risks, as these agents dynamically interact with financial protocols and immutable smart contracts. This paper investigates the vulnerabilities of AI agents within blockchain-based financial ecosystems when exposed to adversarial threats in real-world scenarios. We introduce the concept of context manipulation, a comprehensive attack vector that exploits unprotected context surfaces, including input channels, memory modules, and external data feeds. Through empirical analysis of ElizaOS, a decentralized AI agent framework for automated Web3 operations, we demonstrate how adversaries can manipulate context by injecting malicious instructions into prompts or historical interaction records, leading to unintended asset transfers and protocol violations which could be financially devastating. To quantify these vulnerabilities, we design CrAIBench, a Web3 domain-specific benchmark that evaluates the robustness of AI agents against context manipulation attacks across 150+ realistic blockchain tasks, including token transfers, trading, bridges and cross-chain interactions and 500+ attack test cases using context manipulation. We systematically assess attack and defense strategies, analyzing factors like the influence of security prompts, reasoning models, and the effectiveness of alignment techniques. Our findings show that prompt-based defenses are insufficient when adversaries corrupt stored context, achieving significant attack success rates despite these defenses. Fine-tuning-based defenses offer a more robust alternative, substantially reducing attack success rates while preserving utility on single-step tasks. This research highlights the urgent need to develop AI agents that are both secure and fiduciarily responsible.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has led to the widespread deployment of LLM agents across diverse industries, including customer service, content generation, data analysis, and even healthcare. However, as more LLM agents are deployed, a major issue has emerged: there is no standard way for these agents to communicate with external tools or data sources. This lack of standardized protocols makes it difficult for agents to work together or scale effectively, and it limits their ability to tackle complex, real-world tasks. A unified communication protocol for LLM agents could change this. It would allow agents and tools to interact more smoothly, encourage collaboration, and triggering the formation of collective intelligence. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of existing agent protocols, proposing a systematic two-dimensional classification that differentiates context-oriented versus inter-agent protocols and general-purpose versus domain-specific protocols. Additionally, we conduct a comparative performance analysis of these protocols across key dimensions such as security, scalability, and latency. Finally, we explore the future landscape of agent protocols by identifying critical research directions and characteristics necessary for next-generation protocols. These characteristics include adaptability, privacy preservation, and group-based interaction, as well as trends toward layered architectures and collective intelligence infrastructures. We expect this work to serve as a practical reference for both researchers and engineers seeking to design, evaluate, or integrate robust communication infrastructures for intelligent agents.

We introduce ABC, a fully open-source stack for manipulation with behavior cloning. At its core is ABC-130K: the largest open-source teleoperation dataset to date, featuring 3,500 hours of data spanning over 130K episodes across 195 diverse tasks. Furthermore, we open-source our accessible hardware setup, training infrastructure, and simulation pipeline. We also release 400 hours of sim-teleop data and provide a co-training recipe that produces correlated simulation and real-world evaluation, offering a reliable proxy for ablating model-design and training decisions before costly real-world evaluation. We explore various training recipes and compare common architectural choices for Diffusion Transformers (DiT) and Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models, grounding our findings in real-world evaluations. The resulting policies successfully execute dexterous tasks such as box folding and extracting credit cards from wallets. By providing a reproducible toolkit, we aim to place researchers on an equal footing, establishing the necessary foundation to learn the ABCs of Behavior Cloning together as a community.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables large language models to invoke external tools through natural-language descriptions, forming the foundation of many AI agent applications. However, MCP does not enforce consistency between documented tool behavior and actual code execution, even though MCP Servers often run with broad system privileges. This gap introduces a largely unexplored security risk. We study how mismatches between externally presented tool descriptions and underlying implementations systematically shape the mental models and decision-making behavior of intelligent agents. Specifically, we present the first large-scale study of description-code inconsistency in the MCP ecosystem. We design an automated static analysis framework and apply it to 10,240 real-world MCP Servers across 36 categories. Our results show that while most servers are highly consistent, approximately 13% exhibit substantial mismatches that can enable undocumented privileged operations, hidden state mutations, or unauthorized financial actions. We further observe systematic differences across application categories, popularity levels, and MCP marketplaces. Our findings demonstrate that description-code inconsistency is a concrete and prevalent attack surface in MCP-based AI agents, and motivate the need for systematic auditing and stronger transparency guarantees in future agent ecosystems.

Bimanual robotic manipulation is a long-standing challenge of embodied intelligence due to its characteristics of dual-arm spatial-temporal coordination and high-dimensional action spaces. Previous studies rely on pre-defined action taxonomies or direct teleoperation to alleviate or circumvent these issues, often making them lack simplicity, versatility and scalability. Differently, we believe that the most effective and efficient way for teaching bimanual manipulation is learning from human demonstrated videos, where rich features such as spatial-temporal positions, dynamic postures, interaction states and dexterous transitions are available almost for free. In this work, we propose the YOTO (You Only Teach Once), which can extract and then inject patterns of bimanual actions from as few as a single binocular observation of hand movements, and teach dual robot arms various complex tasks. Furthermore, based on keyframes-based motion trajectories, we devise a subtle solution for rapidly generating training demonstrations with diverse variations of manipulated objects and their locations. These data can then be used to learn a customized bimanual diffusion policy (BiDP) across diverse scenes. In experiments, YOTO achieves impressive performance in mimicking 5 intricate long-horizon bimanual tasks, possesses strong generalization under different visual and spatial conditions, and outperforms existing visuomotor imitation learning methods in accuracy and efficiency. Our project link is https://hnuzhy.github.io/projects/YOTO.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have achieved impressive results on single-view vision tasks, but lack the multi-view spatial reasoning capabilities essential for embodied AI systems to understand 3D environments and manipulate objects across different viewpoints. In this work, we introduce Cross-View Relations (XVR), a large-scale dataset designed to teach VLMs spatial reasoning across multiple views. XVR comprises 100K vision-question-answer samples derived from 18K diverse 3D scenes and 70K robotic manipulation trajectories, spanning three fundamental spatial reasoning tasks: Correspondence (matching objects across views), Verification (validating spatial relationships), and Localization (identifying object positions). VLMs fine-tuned on XVR achieve substantial improvements on established multi-view and robotic spatial reasoning benchmarks (MindCube and RoboSpatial). When integrated as backbones in Vision-Language-Action models, XVR-trained representations improve success rates on RoboCasa. Our results demonstrate that explicit training on cross-view spatial relations significantly enhances multi-view reasoning and transfers effectively to real-world robotic manipulation.

The foundation of reproducible science lies in protocols that are precise, logically ordered, and executable. The autonomous generation of these protocols through natural language queries could greatly improve the efficiency of the reproduction process. However, current leading large language models (LLMs) often generate incomplete or inconsistent protocols, limiting their utility. To address this limitation, we first introduce SciRecipe, a large-scale dataset of over 12K structured protocols spanning 27 biological subfields and encompassing both comprehension and problem-solving tasks. To further improve protocol generation, we propose the "Sketch-and-Fill" paradigm, which separates analysis, structuring, and expression to ensure each step is explicit and verifiable. Complementing this, the structured component-based reward mechanism evaluates step granularity, action order, and semantic fidelity, aligning model optimization with experimental reliability. Building on these components, we develop Thoth, trained through a staged Knowledge-to-Action process that progresses from knowledge acquisition to operational reasoning and ultimately to robust, executable protocol generation. Across multiple benchmarks, Thoth consistently surpasses both proprietary and open-source LLMs, achieving significant improvements in step alignment, logical sequencing, and semantic accuracy. Our approach paves the way for reliable scientific assistants that bridge knowledge with experimental execution. All data, code, and models will be released publicly.

Imagine Mr. Bean stepping into Tom and Jerry--can we generate videos where characters interact naturally across different worlds? We study inter-character interaction in text-to-video generation, where the key challenge is to preserve each character's identity and behaviors while enabling coherent cross-context interaction. This is difficult because characters may never have coexisted and because mixing styles often causes style delusion, where realistic characters appear cartoonish or vice versa. We introduce a framework that tackles these issues with Cross-Character Embedding (CCE), which learns identity and behavioral logic across multimodal sources, and Cross-Character Augmentation (CCA), which enriches training with synthetic co-existence and mixed-style data. Together, these techniques allow natural interactions between previously uncoexistent characters without losing stylistic fidelity. Experiments on a curated benchmark of cartoons and live-action series with 10 characters show clear improvements in identity preservation, interaction quality, and robustness to style delusion, enabling new forms of generative storytelling.Additional results and videos are available on our project page: https://tingtingliao.github.io/mimix/.

As advanced image manipulation techniques emerge, detecting the manipulation becomes increasingly important. Despite the success of recent learning-based approaches for image manipulation detection, they typically require expensive pixel-level annotations to train, while exhibiting degraded performance when testing on images that are differently manipulated compared with training images. To address these limitations, we propose weakly-supervised image manipulation detection, such that only binary image-level labels (authentic or tampered with) are required for training purpose. Such a weakly-supervised setting can leverage more training images and has the potential to adapt quickly to new manipulation techniques. To improve the generalization ability, we propose weakly-supervised self-consistency learning (WSCL) to leverage the weakly annotated images. Specifically, two consistency properties are learned: multi-source consistency (MSC) and inter-patch consistency (IPC). MSC exploits different content-agnostic information and enables cross-source learning via an online pseudo label generation and refinement process. IPC performs global pair-wise patch-patch relationship reasoning to discover a complete region of manipulation. Extensive experiments validate that our WSCL, even though is weakly supervised, exhibits competitive performance compared with fully-supervised counterpart under both in-distribution and out-of-distribution evaluations, as well as reasonable manipulation localization ability.

In real-world data science and enterprise decision-making, critical information is often fragmented across directly queryable structured sources (e.g., SQL, CSV) and "zombie data" locked in unstructured visual documents (e.g., scanned reports, invoice images). Existing data analytics agents are predominantly limited to processing structured data, failing to activate and correlate this high-value visual information, thus creating a significant gap with industrial needs. To bridge this gap, we introduce DataCross, a novel benchmark and collaborative agent framework for unified, insight-driven analysis across heterogeneous data modalities. DataCrossBench comprises 200 end-to-end analysis tasks across finance, healthcare, and other domains. It is constructed via a human-in-the-loop reverse-synthesis pipeline, ensuring realistic complexity, cross-source dependency, and verifiable ground truth. The benchmark categorizes tasks into three difficulty tiers to evaluate agents' capabilities in visual table extraction, cross-modal alignment, and multi-step joint reasoning. We also propose the DataCrossAgent framework, inspired by the "divide-and-conquer" workflow of human analysts. It employs specialized sub-agents, each an expert on a specific data source, which are coordinated via a structured workflow of Intra-source Deep Exploration, Key Source Identification, and Contextual Cross-pollination. A novel reReAct mechanism enables robust code generation and debugging for factual verification. Experimental results show that DataCrossAgent achieves a 29.7% improvement in factuality over GPT-4o and exhibits superior robustness on high-difficulty tasks, effectively activating fragmented "zombie data" for insightful, cross-modal analysis.

Imitation learning from human hand motion data presents a promising avenue for imbuing robots with human-like dexterity in real-world manipulation tasks. Despite this potential, substantial challenges persist, particularly with the portability of existing hand motion capture (mocap) systems and the difficulty of translating mocap data into effective control policies. To tackle these issues, we introduce DexCap, a portable hand motion capture system, alongside DexIL, a novel imitation algorithm for training dexterous robot skills directly from human hand mocap data. DexCap offers precise, occlusion-resistant tracking of wrist and finger motions based on SLAM and electromagnetic field together with 3D observations of the environment. Utilizing this rich dataset, DexIL employs inverse kinematics and point cloud-based imitation learning to replicate human actions with robot hands. Beyond learning from human motion, DexCap also offers an optional human-in-the-loop correction mechanism to refine and further improve robot performance. Through extensive evaluation across six dexterous manipulation tasks, our approach not only demonstrates superior performance but also showcases the system's capability to effectively learn from in-the-wild mocap data, paving the way for future data collection methods for dexterous manipulation. More details can be found at https://dex-cap.github.io

Reinforcement learning (RL), large language models (LLMs), and vision-language models (VLMs) have been widely studied in isolation. However, existing infrastructure lacks the ability to deploy agents from different decision-making paradigms within the same environment, making it difficult to study them in hybrid multi-agent settings or to compare their behaviour fairly under identical conditions. We present MOSAIC, an open-source platform that bridges this gap by incorporating a diverse set of existing reinforcement learning environments and enabling heterogeneous agents (RL policies, LLMs, VLMs, and human players) to operate within them in ad-hoc team settings with reproducible results. MOSAIC introduces three contributions. (i) An IPC-based worker protocol that wraps both native and third-party frameworks as isolated subprocess workers, each executing its native training and inference logic unmodified, communicating through a versioned inter-process protocol. (ii) An operator abstraction that forms an agent-level interface by mapping workers to agents: each operator, regardless of whether it is backed by an RL policy, an LLM, or a human, conforms to a minimal unified interface. (iii) A deterministic cross-paradigm evaluation framework offering two complementary modes: a manual mode that advances up to N concurrent operators in lock-step under shared seeds for fine-grained visual inspection of behavioural differences, and a script mode that drives automated, long-running evaluation through declarative Python scripts, for reproducible experiments. We release MOSAIC as an open, visual-first platform to facilitate reproducible cross-paradigm research across the RL, LLM, and human-in-the-loop communities.

Reconstructing two hands from monocular RGB images is challenging due to frequent occlusion and mutual confusion. Existing methods mainly learn an entangled representation to encode two interacting hands, which are incredibly fragile to impaired interaction, such as truncated hands, separate hands, or external occlusion. This paper presents ACR (Attention Collaboration-based Regressor), which makes the first attempt to reconstruct hands in arbitrary scenarios. To achieve this, ACR explicitly mitigates interdependencies between hands and between parts by leveraging center and part-based attention for feature extraction. However, reducing interdependence helps release the input constraint while weakening the mutual reasoning about reconstructing the interacting hands. Thus, based on center attention, ACR also learns cross-hand prior that handle the interacting hands better. We evaluate our method on various types of hand reconstruction datasets. Our method significantly outperforms the best interacting-hand approaches on the InterHand2.6M dataset while yielding comparable performance with the state-of-the-art single-hand methods on the FreiHand dataset. More qualitative results on in-the-wild and hand-object interaction datasets and web images/videos further demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach for arbitrary hand reconstruction. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZhengdiYu/Arbitrary-Hands-3D-Reconstruction.

Learning from human video demonstrations remains challenging due to noisy hand-object interactions, unseen objects with partial observation, and cross-embodiment discrepancy. To address these challenges, we present HOWTransfer (Hand-Object Open-World Transfer), a hand-centric framework that distills human demonstrations into contact-aware, taxonomy-informed, and diverse robotic trajectories. Instead of relying on object-specific descriptions, vision-language queries, or explicit object-state tracking, HOWTransfer recovers temporally consistent 3D hand motion and localizes temporal contact intervals by reasoning over observed hand-object interaction cues. The localized contact onsets are then used to retarget human grasp intent into multi-modal parallel-jaw grasp hypotheses, which are propagated along the recovered wrist trajectory to generate robot-executable motions. Finally, a trajectory editing stage refines contact alignment and produces diverse executable variants from a single demonstration. Experiments across diverse manipulation tasks show that HOWTransfer enables accurate contact localization and high-quality robot motion retargeting with 86% success, which is preferred over teleoperated trajectories in a blinded preference study.

Deception is a pervasive feature of human communication and an emerging concern in large language models (LLMs). While recent studies document instances of LLM deception under pressure, most evaluations remain confined to single-turn prompts and fail to capture the long-horizon interactions in which deceptive strategies typically unfold. We introduce the first simulation framework for probing and evaluating deception in LLMs under extended sequences of interdependent tasks and dynamic contextual pressures. Our framework instantiates a multi-agent system: a performer agent tasked with completing tasks and a supervisor agent that evaluates progress, provides feedback, and maintains evolving states of trust. An independent deception auditor then reviews full trajectories to identify when and how deception occurs. We conduct extensive experiments across 11 frontier models, spanning both closed- and open-source systems, and find that deception is model-dependent, increases with event pressure, and consistently erodes supervisor trust. Qualitative analyses further reveal distinct strategies of concealment, equivocation, and falsification. Our findings establish deception as an emergent risk in long-horizon interactions and provide a foundation for evaluating future LLMs in real-world, trust-sensitive contexts.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

Achieving generalized in-hand object rotation remains a significant challenge in robotics, largely due to the difficulty of transferring policies from simulation to the real world. The complex, contact-rich dynamics of dexterous manipulation create a "reality gap" that has limited prior work to constrained scenarios involving simple geometries, limited object sizes and aspect ratios, constrained wrist poses, or customized hands. We address this sim-to-real challenge with a novel framework that enables a single policy, trained in simulation, to generalize to a wide variety of objects and conditions in the real world. The core of our method is a joint-wise dynamics model that learns to bridge the reality gap by effectively fitting limited amount of real-world collected data and then adapting the sim policy's actions accordingly. The model is highly data-efficient and generalizable across different whole-hand interaction distributions by factorizing dynamics across joints, compressing system-wide influences into low-dimensional variables, and learning each joint's evolution from its own dynamic profile, implicitly capturing these net effects. We pair this with a fully autonomous data collection strategy that gathers diverse, real-world interaction data with minimal human intervention. Our complete pipeline demonstrates unprecedented generality: a single policy successfully rotates challenging objects with complex shapes (e.g., animals), high aspect ratios (up to 5.33), and small sizes, all while handling diverse wrist orientations and rotation axes. Comprehensive real-world evaluations and a teleoperation application for complex tasks validate the effectiveness and robustness of our approach. Website: https://meowuu7.github.io/DexNDM/

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

The rapid integration of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) into critical applications is increasingly hindered by persistent safety vulnerabilities. However, existing red-teaming benchmarks are often fragmented, limited to single-turn text interactions, and lack the scalability required for systematic evaluation. To address this, we introduce OpenRT, a unified, modular, and high-throughput red-teaming framework designed for comprehensive MLLM safety evaluation. At its core, OpenRT architects a paradigm shift in automated red-teaming by introducing an adversarial kernel that enables modular separation across five critical dimensions: model integration, dataset management, attack strategies, judging methods, and evaluation metrics. By standardizing attack interfaces, it decouples adversarial logic from a high-throughput asynchronous runtime, enabling systematic scaling across diverse models. Our framework integrates 37 diverse attack methodologies, spanning white-box gradients, multi-modal perturbations, and sophisticated multi-agent evolutionary strategies. Through an extensive empirical study on 20 advanced models (including GPT-5.2, Claude 4.5, and Gemini 3 Pro), we expose critical safety gaps: even frontier models fail to generalize across attack paradigms, with leading models exhibiting average Attack Success Rates as high as 49.14%. Notably, our findings reveal that reasoning models do not inherently possess superior robustness against complex, multi-turn jailbreaks. By open-sourcing OpenRT, we provide a sustainable, extensible, and continuously maintained infrastructure that accelerates the development and standardization of AI safety.

Dexterous manipulation is a critical aspect of human capability, enabling interaction with a wide variety of objects. Recent advancements in learning from human demonstrations and teleoperation have enabled progress for robots in such ability. However, these approaches either require complex data collection such as costly human effort for eye-robot contact, or suffer from poor generalization when faced with novel scenarios. To solve both challenges, we propose a framework, DexH2R, that combines human hand motion retargeting with a task-oriented residual action policy, improving task performance by bridging the embodiment gap between human and robotic dexterous hands. Specifically, DexH2R learns the residual policy directly from retargeted primitive actions and task-oriented rewards, eliminating the need for labor-intensive teleoperation systems. Moreover, we incorporate test-time guidance for novel scenarios by taking in desired trajectories of human hands and objects, allowing the dexterous hand to acquire new skills with high generalizability. Extensive experiments in both simulation and real-world environments demonstrate the effectiveness of our work, outperforming prior state-of-the-arts by 40% across various settings.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

How can we scalably generate data for robotic manipulation, especially on human-like platforms such as dexterous multi-fingered hands? Learning from human videos has recently emerged as a likely answer to this question. However, difficulties in estimating hand-object interaction and crossing the human-to-robot embodiment gap have hindered the adoption of abundant monocular RGB-only human videos as the primary source of robot manipulation data. In this work, we present DO AS I DO, an algorithm to reconstruct and retarget monocular RGB human videos to multi-fingered dexterous robotic hands. DO AS I DO reconstructs hand-object interactions from various egocentric and exocentric in-the-wild video sources. The algorithm then retargets these hand-object interaction estimates into a sequence of actions executable in the real world, yielding robot-complete manipulation data from disparate human videos. Overall, DO AS I DO outperforms previous state of the art in estimating hand-object interactions and extracting dexterous manipulation trajectories from RGB videos, as we show in experiments on datasets with ground truths and on a dataset of video clips collected online. Our experiments enable us to propose an efficacy playbook for practitioners collecting human data for manipulation.

Tactile sensing is critical to fine-grained, contact-rich manipulation tasks, such as insertion and assembly. Prior research has shown the possibility of learning tactile-guided policy from teleoperated demonstration data. However, to provide the demonstration, human users often rely on visual feedback to control the robot. This creates a gap between the sensing modality used for controlling the robot (visual) and the modality of interest (tactile). To bridge this gap, we introduce "MimicTouch", a novel framework for learning policies directly from demonstrations provided by human users with their hands. The key innovations are i) a human tactile data collection system which collects multi-modal tactile dataset for learning human's tactile-guided control strategy, ii) an imitation learning-based framework for learning human's tactile-guided control strategy through such data, and iii) an online residual RL framework to bridge the embodiment gap between the human hand and the robot gripper. Through comprehensive experiments, we highlight the efficacy of utilizing human's tactile-guided control strategy to resolve contact-rich manipulation tasks. The project website is at https://sites.google.com/view/MimicTouch.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into sensitive workflows, raising the stakes for adversarial robustness and safety. This paper introduces Transient Turn Injection(TTI), a new multi-turn attack technique that systematically exploits stateless moderation by distributing adversarial intent across isolated interactions. TTI leverages automated attacker agents powered by large language models to iteratively test and evade policy enforcement in both commercial and open-source LLMs, marking a departure from conventional jailbreak approaches that typically depend on maintaining persistent conversational context. Our extensive evaluation across state-of-the-art models-including those from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Meta, and prominent open-source alternatives-uncovers significant variations in resilience to TTI attacks, with only select architectures exhibiting substantial inherent robustness. Our automated blackbox evaluation framework also uncovers previously unknown model specific vulnerabilities and attack surface patterns, especially within medical and high stakes domains. We further compare TTI against established adversarial prompting methods and detail practical mitigation strategies, such as session level context aggregation and deep alignment approaches. Our study underscores the urgent need for holistic, context aware defenses and continuous adversarial testing to future proof LLM deployments against evolving multi-turn threats.

While vision-language-action (VLA) models have advanced generalist robotic learning, cross-embodiment transfer remains challenging due to kinematic heterogeneity and the high cost of collecting sufficient real-world demonstrations to support fine-tuning. Existing cross-embodiment policies typically rely on shared-private architectures, which suffer from limited capacity of private parameters and lack explicit adaptation mechanisms. To address these limitations, we introduce MOTIF for efficient few-shot cross-embodiment transfer that decouples embodiment-agnostic spatiotemporal patterns, termed action motifs, from heterogeneous action data. Specifically, MOTIF first learns unified motifs via vector quantization with progress-aware alignment and embodiment adversarial constraints to ensure temporal and cross-embodiment consistency. We then design a lightweight predictor that predicts these motifs from real-time inputs to guide a flow-matching policy, fusing them with robot-specific states to enable action generation on new embodiments. Evaluations across both simulation and real-world environments validate the superiority of MOTIF, which significantly outperforms strong baselines in few-shot transfer scenarios by 6.5% in simulation and 43.7% in real-world settings. Code is available at https://github.com/buduz/MOTIF.

Large language models (LLMs) are evolving into agentic systems that reason, plan, and operate external tools. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a key enabler of this transition, offering a standardized interface for connecting LLMs with heterogeneous tools and services. Yet MCP's openness and multi-server workflows introduce new safety risks that existing benchmarks fail to capture, as they focus on isolated attacks or lack real-world coverage. We present MCP-SafetyBench, a comprehensive benchmark built on real MCP servers that supports realistic multi-turn evaluation across five domains: browser automation, financial analysis, location navigation, repository management, and web search. It incorporates a unified taxonomy of 20 MCP attack types spanning server, host, and user sides, and includes tasks requiring multi-step reasoning and cross-server coordination under uncertainty. Using MCP-SafetyBench, we systematically evaluate leading open- and closed-source LLMs, revealing that all models remain vulnerable to MCP attacks, with a notable safety-utility trade-off. Our results highlight the urgent need for stronger defenses and establish MCP-SafetyBench as a foundation for diagnosing and mitigating safety risks in real-world MCP deployments.