Daily Papers

Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive -- collectively accounting for all possible outcomes -- and mutually exclusive -- only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices of all related outcomes should be \1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) 1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities. A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring O(2^{n+m}) comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets. We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

Consider a market of competing model providers selling query access to models with varying costs and capabilities. Customers submit problem instances and are willing to pay up to a budget for a verifiable solution. An arbitrageur efficiently allocates inference budget across providers to undercut the market, thus creating a competitive offering with no model-development risk. In this work, we initiate the study of arbitrage in AI model markets, empirically demonstrating the viability of arbitrage and illustrating its economic consequences. We conduct an in-depth case study of SWE-bench GitHub issue resolution using two representative models, GPT-5 mini and DeepSeek v3.2. In this verifiable domain, simple arbitrage strategies generate net profit margins of up to 40%. Robust arbitrage strategies that generalize across different domains remain profitable. Distillation further creates strong arbitrage opportunities, potentially at the expense of the teacher model's revenue. Multiple competing arbitrageurs drive down consumer prices, reducing the marginal revenue of model providers. At the same time, arbitrage reduces market segmentation and facilitates market entry for smaller model providers by enabling earlier revenue capture. Our results suggest that arbitrage can be a powerful force in AI model markets with implications for model development, distillation, and deployment.

Paper 1 of this research programme develops a resolution-aware risk-design framework for the simplest event-linked perpetual: a contract whose underlying tracks a single binary prediction-market probability through resolution. The instrument class is broader. Variants span conditional probabilities P(A|B), spreads p^A - p^B, weighted baskets sum w_i p^(i), derivatives on variance or entropy of the probability process, contracts on liquidity itself, perpetual-on-expiring-event roll structures, and funding-only derivatives with no settlement. Each variant inherits some framework components from the single-market binary case and requires its own design adaptations. This paper develops a formal taxonomy of seven pure-form canonical variants beyond the probability-index perpetual of Paper 1, organised along four orthogonal design axes: underlying geometry, temporal structure, settlement structure, and venue composition. The list is not exhaustive; combinations are not treated separately. For each variant we provide a precise payoff definition; an inheritance map identifying which Paper 1 components carry over, are modified, or fail; variant-specific design constraints; microstructure properties; empirical evaluability on the PMXT v2 archive; and limitations. Notable findings: the conditional variant admits a candidate non-portability proposition (denominator instability as the conditioning event becomes improbable); the spread variant requires a three-channel decomposition of resolution risk; the volatility/entropy variant avoids random binary terminal-collapse but introduces estimator-convention and entropy-decay issues; the basket variant requires multi-period jump-aware margin whose aggregation is correlation-dependent. The paper is theoretical primarily; it specifies how demonstrative time series can be constructed and provides evaluability criteria to guide future work.

We propose a machine learning-based extension of the classical binomial option pricing model that incorporates key market microstructure effects. Traditional models assume frictionless markets, overlooking empirical features such as bid-ask spreads, discrete price movements, and serial return correlations. Our framework augments the binomial tree with path-dependent transition probabilities estimated via Random Forest classifiers trained on high-frequency market data. This approach preserves no-arbitrage conditions while embedding real-world trading dynamics into the pricing model. Using 46,655 minute-level observations of SPY from January to June 2025, we achieve an AUC of 88.25% in forecasting one-step price movements. Order flow imbalance is identified as the most influential predictor, contributing 43.2% to feature importance. After resolving time-scaling inconsistencies in tree construction, our model yields option prices that deviate by 13.79% from Black-Scholes benchmarks, highlighting the impact of microstructure on fair value estimation. While computational limitations restrict the model to short-term derivatives, our results offer a robust, data-driven alternative to classical pricing methods grounded in empirical market behavior.

Modern Large Language Models achieve impressive reasoning capabilities with long Chain of Thoughts, but they incur substantial computational cost during inference, and this motivates techniques to improve the performance-cost ratio. Among these techniques, Speculative Decoding accelerates inference by employing a fast but inaccurate draft model to autoregressively propose tokens, which are then verified in parallel by a more capable target model. However, due to unnecessary rejections caused by token mismatches in semantically equivalent steps, traditional token-level Speculative Decoding struggles in reasoning tasks. Although recent works have shifted to step-level semantic verification, which improve efficiency by accepting or rejecting entire reasoning steps, existing step-level methods still regenerate many rejected steps with little improvement, wasting valuable target compute. To address this challenge, we propose Arbitrage, a novel step-level speculative generation framework that routes generation dynamically based on the relative advantage between draft and target models. Instead of applying a fixed acceptance threshold, Arbitrage uses a lightweight router trained to predict when the target model is likely to produce a meaningfully better step. This routing approximates an ideal Arbitrage Oracle that always chooses the higher-quality step, achieving near-optimal efficiency-accuracy trade-offs. Across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks, Arbitrage consistently surpasses prior step-level Speculative Decoding baselines, reducing inference latency by up to sim2times at matched accuracy.

This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical framework that imports concepts from stochastic thermodynamics to model price impact and characterize the feasibility of round-trip arbitrage in financial markets. A trading cycle is treated as a non-equilibrium thermodynamic process, where price impact represents dissipative work and market noise plays the role of thermal fluctuations. The paper proves a Financial Second Law: under general convex impact functionals, any round-trip trading strategy yields non-positive expected profit. This structural constraint is complemented by a fluctuation theorem that bounds the probability of profitable cycles in terms of dissipated work and market volatility. The framework introduces a statistical ensemble of trading strategies governed by a Gibbs measure, leading to a free energy decomposition that connects expected cost, strategy entropy, and a market temperature parameter. The framework provides rigorous, testable inequalities linking microstructural impact to macroscopic no-arbitrage conditions, offering a novel physics-inspired perspective on market efficiency. The paper derives explicit analytical results for prototypical trading strategies and discusses empirical validation protocols.

The use of synthetic data has played a critical role in recent state-of-art breakthroughs. However, overly relying on a single oracle teacher model to generate data has been shown to lead to model collapse and invite propagation of biases. These limitations are particularly evident in multilingual settings, where the absence of a universally effective teacher model that excels across all languages presents significant challenges. In this work, we address these extreme difference by introducing "multilingual arbitrage", which capitalizes on performance variations between multiple models for a given language. To do so, we strategically route samples through a diverse pool of models, each with unique strengths in different languages. Across exhaustive experiments on state-of-art models, our work suggests that arbitrage techniques allow for spectacular gains in performance that far outperform relying on a single teacher. In particular, compared to the best single teacher, we observe gains of up to 56.5% improvement in win rates averaged across all languages when switching to multilingual arbitrage. We observe the most significant gains for the least resourced languages in our pool.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

Perpetual futures are the most popular cryptocurrency derivatives. Perpetuals offer leveraged exposure to their underlying without rollover or direct ownership. Unlike fixed-maturity futures, perpetuals are not guaranteed to converge to the spot price. To minimize the gap between perpetual and spot prices, long investors periodically pay shorts a funding rate proportional to this difference. We derive no-arbitrage prices for perpetual futures in frictionless markets and bounds in markets with trading costs. Empirically, deviations from these prices in crypto are larger than in traditional currency markets, comove across currencies, and diminish over time. An implied arbitrage strategy yields high Sharpe ratios.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

We study permissionless spot--perpetual basis trading in decentralized finance as a collateral control problem. The strategy holds spot inventory, hedges directional exposure with a short perpetual, and allocates capital between spot inventory and derivative margin under on-chain liquidity and execution frictions. The paper delivers three results. First, it solves a static control problem for the collateral share and shows that the risk-constrained formulation provides a more robust operating benchmark relative to the economic optimum. In comparative calibration, the required collateral rises monotonically under volatility stress. The collateral is the lowest for BTC and increases significantly for long tail assets such as LINK and DOGE. Second, the paper derives an asymmetric dynamic extension in which the lower boundary of intervention is solvency driven, and the upper boundary is determined by a trade-off between carry-loss and the cost of rebalancing. Monte Carlo simulation shows that the lower boundary remains structurally relevant, whereas meaningful interior upper triggers survive mainly in the regimes with high carry and low costs. Third, the paper validates an execution-aware implementation with live routed execution and historical backtests. The execution layer shows that the realized wedges are significant, but become worse in the case of selling the basis. This justifies a minimum effective rebalancing size and a positive execution buffer. The historical validation shows that in the case of a fixed control rule the realized performance is predominantly explained by the funding environment.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Prediction markets are designed to aggregate dispersed information about future events, yet today's ecosystem is fragmented across heterogeneous operator-run platforms and blockchain-based protocols that independently list economically identical events. In the absence of a shared notion of event identity, liquidity fails to pool across venues, arbitrage becomes capital-intensive or unenforceable, and prices systematically violate the Law of One Price. As a result, market prices reflect platform-local beliefs rather than a single, globally aggregated probability, undermining the core information-aggregation function of prediction markets. We address this gap by introducing a semantic alignment framework that makes cross-platform event identity explicit through joint analysis of natural-language descriptions, resolution semantics, and temporal scope. Applying this framework, we construct the first human-validated, cross-platform dataset of aligned prediction markets, covering over 100 000 events across ten major venues from 2018 to 2025. Using this dataset, we show that roughly 6% of all events are concurrently listed across platforms and that semantically equivalent markets exhibit persistent execution-aware price deviations of 2-4% on average, even in highly liquid and information-rich settings. These mispricings give rise to persistent cross-platform arbitrage opportunities driven by structural frictions rather than informational disagreement. Overall, our results demonstrate that semantic non-fungibility is a fundamental barrier to price convergence, and that resolving event identity is a prerequisite for prediction markets to aggregate information at a global scale.

Autodeleveraging (ADL) is a last-resort loss socialization mechanism for perpetual futures venues. It is triggered when solvency-preserving liquidations fail. Despite the dominance of perpetual futures in the crypto derivatives market, with over \60 trillion of volume in 2024, there has been no formal study of ADL. In this paper, we provide the first rigorous model of ADL. We prove that ADL mechanisms face a fundamental trilemma: no policy can simultaneously satisfy exchange solvency, revenue, and fairness to traders. This impossibility theorem implies that as participation scales, a novel form of moral hazard grows asymptotically, rendering `zero-loss' socialization impossible. On the positive side, we show that three classes of ADL mechanisms can optimally navigate this trilemma to provide fairness, robustness to price shocks, and maximal exchange revenue. We analyze these mechanisms on the Hyperliquid dataset from October 10, 2025, when ADL was used repeatedly to close 2.1 billion of positions in 12 minutes. By comparing production ADL to transparent benchmark allocations, we find that Hyperliquid's production algorithm overshot the minimum trader profit haircut required to cover the shortfall. Our methodology suggests the excess profits lost by profitable traders is between \45.0M and 51.7M. In terms of the positions liquidated, this corresponds to roughly \$653.6M of positions being closed. This comparison also suggests that Binance overutilized ADL far more than Hyperliquid. Our results show both theoretically and empirically that optimized ADL mechanisms can dramatically reduce losses of trader profitability while maintaining exchange solvency.

Combinatorial optimization (CO) is naturally discrete, making machine learning based on differentiable optimization inapplicable. Karalias & Loukas (2020) adapted the probabilistic method to incorporate CO into differentiable optimization. Their work ignited the research on unsupervised learning for CO, composed of two main components: probabilistic objectives and derandomization. However, each component confronts unique challenges. First, deriving objectives under various conditions (e.g., cardinality constraints and minimum) is nontrivial. Second, the derandomization process is underexplored, and the existing derandomization methods are either random sampling or naive rounding. In this work, we aim to tackle prevalent (i.e., commonly involved) conditions in unsupervised CO. First, we concretize the targets for objective construction and derandomization with theoretical justification. Then, for various conditions commonly involved in different CO problems, we derive nontrivial objectives and derandomization to meet the targets. Finally, we apply the derivations to various CO problems. Via extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world graphs, we validate the correctness of our derivations and show our empirical superiority w.r.t. both optimization quality and speed.

We investigate stochastic combinatorial multi-armed bandit with semi-bandit feedback (CMAB). In CMAB, the question of the existence of an efficient policy with an optimal asymptotic regret (up to a factor poly-logarithmic with the action size) is still open for many families of distributions, including mutually independent outcomes, and more generally the multivariate sub-Gaussian family. We propose to answer the above question for these two families by analyzing variants of the Combinatorial Thompson Sampling policy (CTS). For mutually independent outcomes in [0,1], we propose a tight analysis of CTS using Beta priors. We then look at the more general setting of multivariate sub-Gaussian outcomes and propose a tight analysis of CTS using Gaussian priors. This last result gives us an alternative to the Efficient Sampling for Combinatorial Bandit policy (ESCB), which, although optimal, is not computationally efficient.

Neurosymbolic approaches integrating large language models with formal reasoning have recently achieved human-level performance on mathematics competition problems in algebra, geometry and number theory. In comparison, combinatorics remains a challenging domain, characterized by a lack of appropriate benchmarks and theorem libraries. To address this gap, we introduce CombiBench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 100 combinatorial problems, each formalized in Lean~4 and paired with its corresponding informal statement. The problem set covers a wide spectrum of difficulty levels, ranging from middle school to IMO and university level, and span over ten combinatorial topics. CombiBench is suitable for testing IMO solving capabilities since it includes all IMO combinatorial problems since 2000 (except IMO 2004 P3 as its statement contain an images). Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive and standardized evaluation framework, dubbed Fine-Eval (for Fill-in-the-blank in Lean Evaluation), for formal mathematics. It accommodates not only proof-based problems but also, for the first time, the evaluation of fill-in-the-blank questions. Using Fine-Eval as the evaluation method and Kimina Lean Server as the backend, we benchmark several LLMs on CombiBench and observe that their capabilities for formally solving combinatorial problems remain limited. Among all models tested (none of which has been trained for this particular task), Kimina-Prover attains the best results, solving 7 problems (out of 100) under both ``with solution'' and ``without solution'' scenarios. We open source the benchmark dataset alongside with the code of the proposed evaluation method at https://github.com/MoonshotAI/CombiBench/.

As the global economy transitions toward decarbonization, the aluminium sector has become a focal point for strategic resource management. While policies such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) aim to reduce emissions, they have inadvertently widened the price arbitrage between primary metal, scrap, and semi-finished goods, creating new incentives for market optimization. This study presents a unified, unsupervised machine learning framework to detect and classify emerging trade anomalies within UN Comtrade data (2020 to 2024). Moving beyond traditional rule-based monitoring, we apply a four-layer analytical pipeline utilizing Forensic Statistics, Isolation Forests, Network Science, and Deep Autoencoders. Contrary to the hypothesis that Sustainability Arbitrage would be the primary driver, empirical results reveal a contradictory and more severe phenomenon of Hardware Masking. Illicit actors exploit bi-directional tariff incentives by misclassifying scrap as high-count heterogeneous goods to justify extreme unit-price outliers of >$160/kg, a 1,900% markup indicative of Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) rather than commercial arbitrage. Topologically, risk is not concentrated in major exporters but in high-centrality Shadow Hubs that function as pivotal nodes for illicit rerouting. These actors execute a strategy of Void-Shoring, systematically suppressing destination data to Unspecified Code to fracture mirror statistics and sever forensic trails. Validated by SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations), the results confirm that price deviation is the dominant predictor of anomalies, necessitating a paradigm shift in customs enforcement from physical volume checks to dynamic, algorithmic valuation auditing.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

We improve the efficiency of algorithms for stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits. In most interesting problems, state-of-the-art algorithms take advantage of structural properties of rewards, such as independence. However, while being optimal in terms of asymptotic regret, these algorithms are inefficient. In our paper, we first reduce their implementation to a specific submodular maximization. Then, in case of matroid constraints, we design adapted approximation routines, thereby providing the first efficient algorithms that rely on reward structure to improve regret bound. In particular, we improve the state-of-the-art efficient gap-free regret bound by a factor m/log m, where m is the maximum action size. Finally, we show how our improvement translates to more general budgeted combinatorial semi-bandits.

We describe a library of mathematical finance built in the Lean 4 proof assistant, on top of Mathlib and the BrownianMotion package. It is broad: more than two hundred sorry-free theorems across eleven areas, from the measure-theoretic foundations of continuous-time stochastic calculus through derivative pricing to applied risk, portfolio, and fixed-income theory, and, to our knowledge, the most comprehensive machine-checked development of mathematical finance to date. Breadth is the setting, not the point. Two things make it more than a catalogue. It reaches into the continuous theory far enough to construct the L2 Itô integral as a bounded linear isometry and to derive, rather than assume, the risk-neutral pricing measure. And it audits its own faithfulness: every result is classified by how its Lean statement relates to the mathematics it claims, and a build-enforced gate pins the axioms each proof actually uses, so a reader can see precisely what has been proved and what has only been proved under added hypotheses. We close with a candid finding: a formal base over classical financial mathematics yields certified unification of known results rather than new financial theory. The contribution is therefore methodological and infrastructural, reusable verified foundations for mathematical finance, together with the faithfulness audit.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Combinatorial optimization problems involving multiple agents are notoriously challenging due to their NP-hard nature and the necessity for effective agent coordination. Despite advancements in learning-based methods, existing approaches often face critical limitations, including suboptimal agent coordination, poor generalizability, and high computational latency. To address these issues, we propose Parallel AutoRegressive Combinatorial Optimization (PARCO), a reinforcement learning framework designed to construct high-quality solutions for multi-agent combinatorial tasks efficiently. To this end, PARCO integrates three key components: (1) transformer-based communication layers to enable effective agent collaboration during parallel solution construction, (2) a multiple pointer mechanism for low-latency, parallel agent decision-making, and (3) priority-based conflict handlers to resolve decision conflicts via learned priorities. We evaluate PARCO in multi-agent vehicle routing and scheduling problems where our approach outperforms state-of-the-art learning methods and demonstrates strong generalization ability and remarkable computational efficiency. Code available at: https://github.com/ai4co/parco.

We define a new class of set functions that in addition to being monotone and subadditive, also admit a very limited form of submodularity defined over a permutation of the ground set. We refer to this permutation as a submodular order. This class of functions includes monotone submodular functions as a sub-family. To understand the importance of this structure in optimization problems we consider the problem of maximizing function value under various types of constraints. To demonstrate the modeling power of submodular order functions we show applications in two different settings. First, we apply our results to the extensively studied problem of assortment optimization. While the objectives in assortment optimization are known to be non-submodular (and non-monotone) even for simple choice models, we show that they are compatible with the notion of submodular order. Consequently, we obtain new and in some cases the first constant factor guarantee for constrained assortment optimization in fundamental choice models. As a second application of submodular order functions, we show an intriguing connection to the maximization of monotone submodular functions in the streaming model. We recover some best known guarantees for this problem as a corollary of our results.

In this work, we introduce amortizing perpetual options (AmPOs), a fungible variant of continuous-installment options suitable for exchange-based trading. Traditional installment options lapse when holders cease their payments, destroying fungibility across units of notional. AmPOs replace explicit installment payments and the need for lapsing logic with an implicit payment scheme via the decay of the claimable notional. This amortization ensures all units evolve identically, preserving fungibility. We demonstrate that AmPO valuation can be reduced to an equivalent vanilla perpetual American option on a dividend-paying asset. This enables analytical expressions for the exercise boundaries and risk-neutral valuations for calls and puts. These formulas and relations allow us to derive the Greeks and study comparative statics with respect to the amortization rate. Illustrative numerical case studies demonstrate how the amortization rate shapes option behavior and reveal the resulting tradeoffs in the effective volatility sensitivity.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

We propose a reinforcement learning (RL) framework under a broad class of risk objectives, characterized by convex scoring functions. This class covers many common risk measures, such as variance, Expected Shortfall, entropic Value-at-Risk, and mean-risk utility. To resolve the time-inconsistency issue, we consider an augmented state space and an auxiliary variable and recast the problem as a two-state optimization problem. We propose a customized Actor-Critic algorithm and establish some theoretical approximation guarantees. A key theoretical contribution is that our results do not require the Markov decision process to be continuous. Additionally, we propose an auxiliary variable sampling method inspired by the alternating minimization algorithm, which is convergent under certain conditions. We validate our approach in simulation experiments with a financial application in statistical arbitrage trading, demonstrating the effectiveness of the algorithm.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions coupled with shared policy learning constitutes an efficient solution to this problem. By playing against each other, our deep-reinforcement-learning-driven agents learn emergent behaviors relative to a wide spectrum of objectives encompassing profit-and-loss, optimal execution and market share. In particular, we find that liquidity providers naturally learn to balance hedging and skewing, where skewing refers to setting their buy and sell prices asymmetrically as a function of their inventory. We further introduce a novel RL-based calibration algorithm which we found performed well at imposing constraints on the game equilibrium. On the theoretical side, we are able to show convergence rates for our multi-agent policy gradient algorithm under a transitivity assumption, closely related to generalized ordinal potential games.

We consider a combinatorial multi-armed bandit problem for maximum value reward function under maximum value and index feedback. This is a new feedback structure that lies in between commonly studied semi-bandit and full-bandit feedback structures. We propose an algorithm and provide a regret bound for problem instances with stochastic arm outcomes according to arbitrary distributions with finite supports. The regret analysis rests on considering an extended set of arms, associated with values and probabilities of arm outcomes, and applying a smoothness condition. Our algorithm achieves a O((k/Delta)log(T)) distribution-dependent and a O(T) distribution-independent regret where k is the number of arms selected in each round, Delta is a distribution-dependent reward gap and T is the horizon time. Perhaps surprisingly, the regret bound is comparable to previously-known bound under more informative semi-bandit feedback. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm through experimental results.

The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing states that a market is free of arbitrage exactly when it admits an equivalent martingale measure. We formalize it in Lean 4 over Mathlib in three settings: a finite-state market over a finite horizon (Harrison-Pliska), a one-period market on an arbitrary probability space with a single scalar return (Follmer-Schied), and a one-period market with finitely many assets. The finite case is the geometry of a separating hyperplane; the scalar one-period case is an elementary change of measure. In the d-asset case the equivalent martingale measure is constructed explicitly, as the minimiser of the smooth convex potential E[log(1+e^{langleθ,Yrangle})]: absence of arbitrage is precisely coercivity of the potential, its first-order condition is the martingale property, and the minimiser's logistic weight is the density of the measure. The construction uses no Hahn-Banach theorem, no L^0-closedness argument, no measurable selection, and no non-redundancy hypothesis. To our knowledge this is the first machine-checked Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing in any proof assistant. The boundary is explicit: the general multi-period Dalang-Morton-Willinger theorem lies outside the development. Every theorem is sorry-free, each headline result's axioms are pinned to Mathlib's classical defaults by a build-enforced gate, and the whole is reproducible from a pinned toolchain.

We consider a contextual combinatorial bandit problem where in each round a learning agent selects a subset of arms and receives feedback on the selected arms according to their scores. The score of an arm is an unknown function of the arm's feature. Approximating this unknown score function with deep neural networks, we propose algorithms: Combinatorial Neural UCB (CN-UCB) and Combinatorial Neural Thompson Sampling (CN-TS). We prove that CN-UCB achieves mathcal{O}(d T) or mathcal{O}(tilde{d T K}) regret, where d is the effective dimension of a neural tangent kernel matrix, K is the size of a subset of arms, and T is the time horizon. For CN-TS, we adapt an optimistic sampling technique to ensure the optimism of the sampled combinatorial action, achieving a worst-case (frequentist) regret of mathcal{O}(d TK). To the best of our knowledge, these are the first combinatorial neural bandit algorithms with regret performance guarantees. In particular, CN-TS is the first Thompson sampling algorithm with the worst-case regret guarantees for the general contextual combinatorial bandit problem. The numerical experiments demonstrate the superior performances of our proposed algorithms.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

Polymarket has emerged as a prominent prediction market platform and one of the fastest-growing applications in DeFi. To achieve low-latency trading, it adopts a hybrid architecture that matches orders off-chain but settles them on-chain for final execution. This design creates a consistency gap we call Ghost Fills: an order that is successfully matched off-chain may later fail during on-chain settlement. To understand the security implications of this gap, we investigate such failed settlements by building GHOSTHUNTER, which reconstructs them from on-chain traces and attributes to concrete attack patterns. Across 1,952,440 reverted match-order transactions, we find that attackers exploit the time gap between matching and settlement to invalidate already matched orders before they are finalized on-chain. We then identify four attack vectors from these incidents: nonce bump, balance drain, allowance revoke, and proxy trap, realized via 35 evolving variants. These vectors allow attackers to selectively revert 980,133 filled orders, enabling risk-free prediction, arbitrage-bot hunting, and liquidity reward manipulation, realizing at least \1.49M in profit, which places 1.78 B USD at risk and 2.17 M POL (about \212 K) paid by operator. During peak hours, more than 24.3% of all filled orders reverted, causing de facto DoS attacks. We also find that code derived from the flawed contract still appears in 167 independent contracts across 10 chains holding at least 23 M in user funds, extending the impact beyond Polymarket. We have disclosed our evidence to affected parties, and the issue has been partially mitigated.

This paper proposes a novel approach to hedging portfolios of risky assets when financial markets are affected by financial turmoils. We introduce a completely novel approach to diversification activity not on the level of single assets but on the level of ensemble algorithmic investment strategies (AIS) built based on the prices of these assets. We employ four types of diverse theoretical models (LSTM - Long Short-Term Memory, ARIMA-GARCH - Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average - Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity, momentum, and contrarian) to generate price forecasts, which are then used to produce investment signals in single and complex AIS. In such a way, we are able to verify the diversification potential of different types of investment strategies consisting of various assets (energy commodities, precious metals, cryptocurrencies, or soft commodities) in hedging ensemble AIS built for equity indices (S&P 500 index). Empirical data used in this study cover the period between 2004 and 2022. Our main conclusion is that LSTM-based strategies outperform the other models and that the best diversifier for the AIS built for the S&P 500 index is the AIS built for Bitcoin. Finally, we test the LSTM model for a higher frequency of data (1 hour). We conclude that it outperforms the results obtained using daily data.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

We consider the combinatorial bandits problem with semi-bandit feedback under finite sampling budget constraints, in which the learner can carry out its action only for a limited number of times specified by an overall budget. The action is to choose a set of arms, whereupon feedback for each arm in the chosen set is received. Unlike existing works, we study this problem in a non-stochastic setting with subset-dependent feedback, i.e., the semi-bandit feedback received could be generated by an oblivious adversary and also might depend on the chosen set of arms. In addition, we consider a general feedback scenario covering both the numerical-based as well as preference-based case and introduce a sound theoretical framework for this setting guaranteeing sensible notions of optimal arms, which a learner seeks to find. We suggest a generic algorithm suitable to cover the full spectrum of conceivable arm elimination strategies from aggressive to conservative. Theoretical questions about the sufficient and necessary budget of the algorithm to find the best arm are answered and complemented by deriving lower bounds for any learning algorithm for this problem scenario.

Online allocation problems with resource constraints are central problems in revenue management and online advertising. In these problems, requests arrive sequentially during a finite horizon and, for each request, a decision maker needs to choose an action that consumes a certain amount of resources and generates reward. The objective is to maximize cumulative rewards subject to a constraint on the total consumption of resources. In this paper, we consider a data-driven setting in which the reward and resource consumption of each request are generated using an input model that is unknown to the decision maker. We design a general class of algorithms that attain good performance in various input models without knowing which type of input they are facing. In particular, our algorithms are asymptotically optimal under independent and identically distributed inputs as well as various non-stationary stochastic input models, and they attain an asymptotically optimal fixed competitive ratio when the input is adversarial. Our algorithms operate in the Lagrangian dual space: they maintain a dual multiplier for each resource that is updated using online mirror descent. By choosing the reference function accordingly, we recover the dual sub-gradient descent and dual multiplicative weights update algorithm. The resulting algorithms are simple, fast, and do not require convexity in the revenue function, consumption function and action space, in contrast to existing methods for online allocation problems. We discuss applications to network revenue management, online bidding in repeated auctions with budget constraints, online proportional matching with high entropy, and personalized assortment optimization with limited inventory.

Combinatorics is central to Olympiad-level mathematical problem solving, requiring deep discrete reasoning, creative constructions, and rigorous structural insight. Recent evidence suggests that even today's strongest frontier models remain uneven on Olympiad combinatorics, revealing a gap in creative mathematical reasoning. We introduce ComBench, an Olympiad-level combinatorics benchmark for evaluating and diagnosing the combinatorial reasoning capabilities of large language models. ComBench contains 100 human-annotated competition-level problems organized around two complementary settings: analysis-centric problems, which primarily require rigorous mathematical arguments, and construction-centric problems, which require explicit constructions in addition to correctness justifications. The evaluation protocol combines rubric-guided proof grading with deterministic construction verification, exposing cases where proof quality and construction validity diverge. Experiments on frontier open- and closed-source models show that ComBench is far from saturated: the strongest model reaches 65.4% overall Avg. and 75.3% overall Best@4. We further find that Rigorous Proof Reasoning and Constructive Realization are distinct capabilities: Kimi-K2.6 trails GPT-5.5 on analysis-centric proof grading but surpasses it on construction-centric Best@4, while Existence and Construction problems remain consistently hardest across representative frontier models.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

The realm of High-Frequency Trading (HFT) is characterized by rapid decision-making processes that capitalize on fleeting market inefficiencies. As the financial markets become increasingly competitive, there is a pressing need for innovative strategies that can adapt and evolve with changing market dynamics. Enter Reinforcement Learning (RL), a branch of machine learning where agents learn by interacting with their environment, making it an intriguing candidate for HFT applications. This paper dives deep into the integration of RL in statistical arbitrage strategies tailored for HFT scenarios. By leveraging the adaptive learning capabilities of RL, we explore its potential to unearth patterns and devise trading strategies that traditional methods might overlook. We delve into the intricate exploration-exploitation trade-offs inherent in RL and how they manifest in the volatile world of HFT. Furthermore, we confront the challenges of applying RL in non-stationary environments, typical of financial markets, and investigate methodologies to mitigate associated risks. Through extensive simulations and backtests, our research reveals that RL not only enhances the adaptability of trading strategies but also shows promise in improving profitability metrics and risk-adjusted returns. This paper, therefore, positions RL as a pivotal tool for the next generation of HFT-based statistical arbitrage, offering insights for both researchers and practitioners in the field.

An agent holds a position in a perpetual contract with payoff function ψ and attempts to liquidate the position while managing transaction costs, inventory risk, and funding rate payments. By solving the agent's stochastic control problem we obtain a closed-form expression for the optimal trading strategy when the payoff function is given by ψ(s) = s. When the payoff function is non-linear we provide approximations to the optimal strategy which apply when the funding rate parameter is small or when the length of the trading interval is small. We further prove that when ψ is non-linear, the short time approximation can be written in terms of the closed-form trading strategy corresponding to the case of the identity payoff function.

Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the years, covered in several books and surveys. This book provides a more introductory, textbook-like treatment of the subject. Each chapter tackles a particular line of work, providing a self-contained, teachable technical introduction and a brief review of the further developments; many of the chapters conclude with exercises. The book is structured as follows. The first four chapters are on IID rewards, from the basic model to impossibility results to Bayesian priors to Lipschitz rewards. The next three chapters cover adversarial rewards, from the full-feedback version to adversarial bandits to extensions with linear rewards and combinatorially structured actions. Chapter 8 is on contextual bandits, a middle ground between IID and adversarial bandits in which the change in reward distributions is completely explained by observable contexts. The last three chapters cover connections to economics, from learning in repeated games to bandits with supply/budget constraints to exploration in the presence of incentives. The appendix provides sufficient background on concentration and KL-divergence. The chapters on "bandits with similarity information", "bandits with knapsacks" and "bandits and agents" can also be consumed as standalone surveys on the respective topics.

Reinforcement learning has demonstrated great potential for performing financial tasks. However, it faces two major challenges: policy instability and sampling bottlenecks. In this paper, we revisit ensemble methods with massively parallel simulations on graphics processing units (GPUs), significantly enhancing the computational efficiency and robustness of trained models in volatile financial markets. Our approach leverages the parallel processing capability of GPUs to significantly improve the sampling speed for training ensemble models. The ensemble models combine the strengths of component agents to improve the robustness of financial decision-making strategies. We conduct experiments in both stock and cryptocurrency trading tasks to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach. Massively parallel simulation on a single GPU improves the sampling speed by up to 1,746times using 2,048 parallel environments compared to a single environment. The ensemble models have high cumulative returns and outperform some individual agents, reducing maximum drawdown by up to 4.17% and improving the Sharpe ratio by up to 0.21. This paper describes trading tasks at ACM ICAIF FinRL Contests in 2023 and 2024.

We investigate stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits, where the entire joint distribution of outcomes impacts the complexity of the problem instance (unlike in the standard bandits). Typical distributions considered depend on specific parameter values, whose prior knowledge is required in theory but quite difficult to estimate in practice; an example is the commonly assumed sub-Gaussian family. We alleviate this issue by instead considering a new general family of sub-exponential distributions, which contains bounded and Gaussian ones. We prove a new lower bound on the expected regret on this family, that is parameterized by the unknown covariance matrix of outcomes, a tighter quantity than the sub-Gaussian matrix. We then construct an algorithm that uses covariance estimates, and provide a tight asymptotic analysis of the regret. Finally, we apply and extend our results to the family of sparse outcomes, which has applications in many recommender systems.

Growth in the penetration of renewable energy sources makes supply more uncertain and leads to an increase in the system imbalance. This trend, together with the single imbalance pricing, opens an opportunity for balance responsible parties (BRPs) to perform energy arbitrage in the imbalance settlement mechanism. To this end, we propose a battery control framework based on distributional reinforcement learning (DRL). Our proposed control framework takes a risk-sensitive perspective, allowing BRPs to adjust their risk preferences: we aim to optimize a weighted sum of the arbitrage profit and a risk measure while constraining the daily number of cycles for the battery. We assess the performance of our proposed control framework using the Belgian imbalance prices of 2022 and compare two state-of-the-art RL methods, deep Q learning and soft actor-critic. Results reveal that the distributional soft actor-critic method can outperform other methods. Moreover, we note that our fully risk-averse agent appropriately learns to hedge against the risk related to the unknown imbalance price by (dis)charging the battery only when the agent is more certain about the price.

We develop and counterfactually evaluate a resolution-aware risk-design framework (PIRAP) for perpetual futures whose underlying tracks a single binary prediction-market probability through resolution. The framework specifies six components: an index estimator combining mid-price, depth-weighted mid, and time-decayed VWAP; jump-aware tiered margin sized against bounded-event terminal-collapse magnitude; leverage compression schedule contracting toward resolution; resolution-aware funding rule with boundary-aware correction; a multi-stage halt protocol; and an eligibility framework. Two formal non-portability propositions establish that standard basis-only funding paired with continuous-vol static margin fails on bounded-event underlyings. Empirical evaluation uses Polymarket's PMXT v2 archive for 2026-04-21 to 2026-04-27 (13,298-market analysis sample passing adequacy gates from 61,087 ingested; 13,115 resolved within the empirical window for E3). E1 evaluates two pre-registered stylized facts; E2 conducts counterfactual replay across three engine configurations; E3 isolates the resolution-zone protocol's contribution. Results are mixed. Five pre-registered floors: stylized-fact floors (boundary depth asymmetry, terminal-jump magnitude) PASS; welfare-side directional floors (final-hour liquidation -6%, drawdown -5.1% pooled, median PnL +14%) two FAIL one PASS; E3 mechanic floors (final-hour liquidation -80% by halt construction PASS; bad-debt frequency +2.4% FAIL). Three of five materiality floors fail: the framework as specified does not validate deployment, but the empirical record establishes a halt-versus-margin scope distinction (halt addresses execution-channel risk; terminal-jump bad-debt remains margin-side) and documents a pre-emption trade-off constraining the dynamic-margin component. The paper concludes with structural recommendations and explicit non-deployable status.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

Combinatorial optimization (CO) problems are often NP-hard and thus out of reach for exact algorithms, making them a tempting domain to apply machine learning methods. The highly structured constraints in these problems can hinder either optimization or sampling directly in the solution space. On the other hand, GFlowNets have recently emerged as a powerful machinery to efficiently sample from composite unnormalized densities sequentially and have the potential to amortize such solution-searching processes in CO, as well as generate diverse solution candidates. In this paper, we design Markov decision processes (MDPs) for different combinatorial problems and propose to train conditional GFlowNets to sample from the solution space. Efficient training techniques are also developed to benefit long-range credit assignment. Through extensive experiments on a variety of different CO tasks with synthetic and realistic data, we demonstrate that GFlowNet policies can efficiently find high-quality solutions.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Combinatorial optimization finds an optimal solution within a discrete set of variables and constraints. The field has seen tremendous progress both in research and industry. With the success of deep learning in the past decade, a recent trend in combinatorial optimization has been to improve state-of-the-art combinatorial optimization solvers by replacing key heuristic components with machine learning (ML) models. In this paper, we investigate two essential aspects of machine learning algorithms for combinatorial optimization: temporal characteristics and attention. We argue that for the task of variable selection in the branch-and-bound (B&B) algorithm, incorporating the temporal information as well as the bipartite graph attention improves the solver's performance. We support our claims with intuitions and numerical results over several standard datasets used in the literature and competitions. Code is available at: https://developer.huaweicloud.com/develop/aigallery/notebook/detail?id=047c6cf2-8463-40d7-b92f-7b2ca998e935

This paper considers the problem of combinatorial multi-armed bandits with semi-bandit feedback and a cardinality constraint on the super-arm size. Existing algorithms for solving this problem typically involve two key sub-routines: (1) a parameter estimation routine that sequentially estimates a set of base-arm parameters, and (2) a super-arm selection policy for selecting a subset of base arms deemed optimal based on these parameters. State-of-the-art algorithms assume access to an exact oracle for super-arm selection with unbounded computational power. At each instance, this oracle evaluates a list of score functions, the number of which grows as low as linearly and as high as exponentially with the number of arms. This can be prohibitive in the regime of a large number of arms. This paper introduces a novel realistic alternative to the perfect oracle. This algorithm uses a combination of group-testing for selecting the super arms and quantized Thompson sampling for parameter estimation. Under a general separability assumption on the reward function, the proposed algorithm reduces the complexity of the super-arm-selection oracle to be logarithmic in the number of base arms while achieving the same regret order as the state-of-the-art algorithms that use exact oracles. This translates to at least an exponential reduction in complexity compared to the oracle-based approaches.

We study distributionally robust expected values under optimal transport distance with a quadratic cost function. In general the duality method, for this computation for the payoff function f, requires the computation of the λc-transform f^{λc}. We show that under the quadratic cost function there exists an intuitive and easily implementable representation of f^{λc}, if f is convex and piecewise linear. We apply this to the robust expected shortfall under the risk-neutral measure of an unhedged call option, from the point of view of the writer, as well as that of a portfolio mixing underlying shares with a call and a put option.

Gross, Mansour, and Tucker introduced the partial-duality polynomial of a ribbon graph [Distributions, European J. Combin. 86, 1--20, 2020], the generating function enumerating partial duals by the Euler genus. Chmutov and Vignes-Tourneret wondered if this polynomial and its conjectured properties would hold for general delta-matroids, which are combinatorial abstractions of ribbon graphs. Yan and Jin contributed to this inquiry by identifying a subset of delta-matroids-specifically, even normal binary ones-whose twist polynomials are characterized by a singular term. Building upon this foundation, the current paper expands the scope of the investigation to encompass even non-binary delta-matroids, revealing that none of them have width-changing twists.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) enable powerful multi-agent systems, but scaling them is economically unsustainable: coordinating heterogeneous agents under information asymmetry often spirals costs. Existing paradigms, such as Mixture-of-Agents and knowledge-based routers, rely on heuristic proxies that ignore costs and collapse uncertainty structure, leading to provably suboptimal coordination. We introduce Agora, a framework that reframes coordination as a decentralized market for uncertainty. Agora formalizes epistemic uncertainty into a structured, tradable asset (perceptual, semantic, inferential), and enforces profitability-driven trading among agents based on rational economic rules. A market-aware broker, extending Thompson Sampling, initiates collaboration and guides the system toward cost-efficient equilibria. Experiments on five multimodal benchmarks (MMMU, MMBench, MathVision, InfoVQA, CC-OCR) show that Agora outperforms strong VLMs and heuristic multi-agent strategies, e.g., achieving +8.5% accuracy over the best baseline on MMMU while reducing cost by over 3x. These results establish market-based coordination as a principled and scalable paradigm for building economically viable multi-agent visual intelligence systems.

We study the problem of optimally projecting the transition matrix of a finite ergodic multivariate Markov chain onto a lower-dimensional state space. Specifically, we seek to construct a projected Markov chain that optimizes various information-theoretic criteria under cardinality constraints. These criteria include entropy rate, information-theoretic distance to factorizability, independence, and stationarity. We formulate these tasks as best subset selection problems over multivariate Markov chains and leverage the submodular (or supermodular) structure of the objective functions to develop efficient greedy-based algorithms with theoretical guarantees. We extend our analysis to k-submodular settings and introduce a generalized version of the distorted greedy algorithm, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we illustrate the theory and algorithms through extensive numerical experiments with publicly available code on multivariate Markov chains associated with the Bernoulli-Laplace and Curie-Weiss model.

We study contextual combinatorial bandits with probabilistically triggered arms (C^2MAB-T) under a variety of smoothness conditions that capture a wide range of applications, such as contextual cascading bandits and contextual influence maximization bandits. Under the triggering probability modulated (TPM) condition, we devise the C^2-UCB-T algorithm and propose a novel analysis that achieves an O(dKT) regret bound, removing a potentially exponentially large factor O(1/p_{min}), where d is the dimension of contexts, p_{min} is the minimum positive probability that any arm can be triggered, and batch-size K is the maximum number of arms that can be triggered per round. Under the variance modulated (VM) or triggering probability and variance modulated (TPVM) conditions, we propose a new variance-adaptive algorithm VAC^2-UCB and derive a regret bound O(dT), which is independent of the batch-size K. As a valuable by-product, our analysis technique and variance-adaptive algorithm can be applied to the CMAB-T and C^2MAB setting, improving existing results there as well. We also include experiments that demonstrate the improved performance of our algorithms compared with benchmark algorithms on synthetic and real-world datasets.

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.

Using a long-standing conjecture from combinatorial group theory, we explore, from multiple perspectives, the challenges of finding rare instances carrying disproportionately high rewards. Based on lessons learned in the context defined by the Andrews-Curtis conjecture, we propose algorithmic enhancements and a topological hardness measure with implications for a broad class of search problems. As part of our study, we also address several open mathematical questions. Notably, we demonstrate the length reducibility of all but two presentations in the Akbulut-Kirby series (1981), and resolve various potential counterexamples in the Miller-Schupp series (1991), including three infinite subfamilies.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

This paper advances the computational efficiency of Deep Hedging frameworks through the novel integration of Kronecker-Factored Approximate Curvature (K-FAC) optimization. While recent literature has established Deep Hedging as a data-driven alternative to traditional risk management strategies, the computational burden of training neural networks with first-order methods remains a significant impediment to practical implementation. The proposed architecture couples Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks with K-FAC second-order optimization, specifically addressing the challenges of sequential financial data and curvature estimation in recurrent networks. Empirical validation using simulated paths from a calibrated Heston stochastic volatility model demonstrates that the K-FAC implementation achieves marked improvements in convergence dynamics and hedging efficacy. The methodology yields a 78.3% reduction in transaction costs (t = 56.88, p < 0.001) and a 34.4% decrease in profit and loss (P&L) variance compared to Adam optimization. Moreover, the K-FAC-enhanced model exhibits superior risk-adjusted performance with a Sharpe ratio of 0.0401, contrasting with -0.0025 for the baseline model. These results provide compelling evidence that second-order optimization methods can materially enhance the tractability of Deep Hedging implementations. The findings contribute to the growing literature on computational methods in quantitative finance while highlighting the potential for advanced optimization techniques to bridge the gap between theoretical frameworks and practical applications in financial markets.

We present a framework for hedging a portfolio of derivatives in the presence of market frictions such as transaction costs, market impact, liquidity constraints or risk limits using modern deep reinforcement machine learning methods. We discuss how standard reinforcement learning methods can be applied to non-linear reward structures, i.e. in our case convex risk measures. As a general contribution to the use of deep learning for stochastic processes, we also show that the set of constrained trading strategies used by our algorithm is large enough to ε-approximate any optimal solution. Our algorithm can be implemented efficiently even in high-dimensional situations using modern machine learning tools. Its structure does not depend on specific market dynamics, and generalizes across hedging instruments including the use of liquid derivatives. Its computational performance is largely invariant in the size of the portfolio as it depends mainly on the number of hedging instruments available. We illustrate our approach by showing the effect on hedging under transaction costs in a synthetic market driven by the Heston model, where we outperform the standard "complete market" solution.

A diversified risk-adjusted time-series momentum (TSMOM) portfolio can deliver substantial abnormal returns and offer some degree of tail risk protection during extreme market events. The performance of existing TSMOM strategies, however, relies not only on the quality of the momentum signal but also on the efficacy of the volatility estimator. Yet many of the existing studies have always considered these two factors to be independent. Inspired by recent progress in Multi-Task Learning (MTL), we present a new approach using MTL in a deep neural network architecture that jointly learns portfolio construction and various auxiliary tasks related to volatility, such as forecasting realized volatility as measured by different volatility estimators. Through backtesting from January 2000 to December 2020 on a diversified portfolio of continuous futures contracts, we demonstrate that even after accounting for transaction costs of up to 3 basis points, our approach outperforms existing TSMOM strategies. Moreover, experiments confirm that adding auxiliary tasks indeed boosts the portfolio's performance. These findings demonstrate that MTL can be a powerful tool in finance.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

Backtests of cryptocurrency perpetual futures are fragile when they ignore microstructure frictions and reuse evaluation windows during parameter search. We study four liquid perpetuals (BTC/USDT, ETH/USDT, SOL/USDT, AVAX/USDT) and quantify how execution delay, funding, fees, and slippage can inflate reported performance. We introduce AutoQuant, an execution-centric, alpha-agnostic framework for auditable strategy configuration selection. AutoQuant encodes strict T+1 execution semantics and no-look-ahead funding alignment, runs Bayesian optimization under realistic costs, and applies a two-stage double-screening protocol across held-out rolling windows and a cost-sensitivity grid. We show that fee-only and zero-cost backtests can materially overestimate annualized returns relative to a fully costed configuration, and that double screening tends to reduce drawdowns under the same strict semantics even when returns are not higher. A CSCV/PBO diagnostic indicates substantial residual overfitting risk, motivating AutoQuant as validation and governance infrastructure rather than a claim of persistent alpha. Returns are reported for small-account simulations with linear trading costs and without market impact or capacity modeling.

As AI systems built from multiple language-model agents become more common, they are increasingly used to make decisions together: discussing, negotiating, and acting on shared tasks. While individual agents may appear well-aligned when tested on their own, problems can arise from how they interact with one another. We introduce the Arbiter, an agent designed to monitor multi-agent conversations in real time and identify which participants may be behaving in misaligned ways. The Arbiter operates under a limited "inspection budget", meaning it must decide carefully how to use its resources. As it observes a conversation step by step, it can choose to wait, question a participant, examine internal information such as system prompts or reasoning traces, or log concerning behavior. At the end, it produces a report identifying the likely source of misalignment. We evaluate the Arbiter across five conversation conditions, ranging from risky financial advice model organisms to evaluation-aware and colluding agents, we test five tool configurations of increasing capability and two backbone models. We find that the Arbiter reliably detects misaligned agents well before the end of the conversation, with active inspection tools improving both detection accuracy and speed. Weight-induced misalignment proves hardest to detect, while instruction-induced misalignment is identified reliably even under passive observation. The logging tool exhibits a dual effect, improving recall at the cost of precision. These results suggest that continual, budget-aware monitoring can effectively catch misalignment, and that overseeing multi-agent systems may require treating the auditor as an active participant in the process. The code is available at https://github.com/aisilab/arbiter.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

There is a large class of problems in algebraic combinatorics which can be distilled into the same challenge: construct an explicit combinatorial bijection. Traditionally, researchers have solved challenges like these by visually inspecting the data for patterns, formulating conjectures, and then proving them. But what is to be done if patterns fail to emerge until the data grows beyond human scale? In this paper, we propose a new workflow for discovering combinatorial bijections via machine learning. As a proof of concept, we train a transformer on paired Dyck paths and use its learned attention patterns to derive a new algorithmic description of the zeta map, which we call the Scaffolding Map.

In this paper, we establish an analytic framework for studying set-valued backward stochastic differential equations (set-valued BSDE), motivated largely by the current studies of dynamic set-valued risk measures for multi-asset or network-based financial models. Our framework will make use of the notion of Hukuhara difference between sets, in order to compensate the lack of "inverse" operation of the traditional Minkowski addition, whence the vector space structure in set-valued analysis. While proving the well-posedness of a class of set-valued BSDEs, we shall also address some fundamental issues regarding generalized Aumann-Itô integrals, especially when it is connected to the martingale representation theorem. In particular, we propose some necessary extensions of the integral that can be used to represent set-valued martingales with non-singleton initial values. This extension turns out to be essential for the study of set-valued BSDEs.

We develop an econometric framework integrating heavy-tailed Student's t distributions with behavioral probability weighting while preserving infinite divisibility. Using 432{,}752 observations across 86 assets (2004--2024), we demonstrate Student's t specifications outperform Gaussian models in 88.4\% of cases. Bounded probability-weighting transformations preserve mathematical properties required for dynamic pricing. Gaussian models underestimate 99\% Value-at-Risk by 19.7\% versus 3.2\% for our specification. Joint estimation procedures identify tail and behavioral parameters with established asymptotic properties. Results provide robust inference for asset-pricing applications where heavy tails and behavioral distortions coexist.

We consider some classical optimization problems in path planning and network transport, and we introduce new auction-based algorithms for their optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are based on mathematical ideas that are related to competitive bidding by persons for objects and the attendant market equilibrium, which underlie auction processes. However, the starting point of our algorithms is different, namely weighted and unweighted path construction in directed graphs, rather than assignment of persons to objects. The new algorithms have several potential advantages over existing methods: they are empirically faster in some important contexts, such as max-flow, they are well-suited for on-line replanning, and they can be adapted to distributed asynchronous operation. Moreover, they allow arbitrary initial prices, without complementary slackness restrictions, and thus are better-suited to take advantage of reinforcement learning methods that use off-line training with data, as well as on-line training during real-time operation. The new algorithms may also find use in reinforcement learning contexts involving approximation, such as multistep lookahead and tree search schemes, and/or rollout algorithms.

The performance of trend following strategies can be ascribed to the difference between long-term and short-term realized variance. We revisit this general result and show that it holds for various definitions of trend strategies. This explains the positive convexity of the aggregate performance of Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) which -- when adequately measured -- turns out to be much stronger than anticipated. We also highlight interesting connections with so-called Risk Parity portfolios. Finally, we propose a new portfolio of strangle options that provides a pure exposure to the long-term variance of the underlying, offering yet another viewpoint on the link between trend and volatility.

Dynamic pricing in retail requires policies that adapt to shifting demand while coordinating decisions across related products. We present a systematic empirical study of multi-agent reinforcement learning for retail price optimization, comparing a strong MAPPO baseline with a graph-attention-augmented variant (MAPPO+GAT) that leverages learned interactions among products. Using a simulated pricing environment derived from real transaction data, we evaluate profit, stability across random seeds, fairness across products, and training efficiency under a standardized evaluation protocol. The results indicate that MAPPO provides a robust and reproducible foundation for portfolio-level price control, and that MAPPO+GAT further enhances performance by sharing information over the product graph without inducing excessive price volatility. These results indicate that graph-integrated MARL provides a more scalable and stable solution than independent learners for dynamic retail pricing, offering practical advantages in multi-product decision-making.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

The financial market is a mission-critical playground for AI agents due to its temporal dynamics and low signal-to-noise ratio. Building an effective algorithmic trading system may require a professional team to develop and test over the years. In this paper, we propose an orchestration framework for financial agents, which aims to democratize financial intelligence to the general public. We map each component of the traditional algorithmic trading system to agents, including planner, orchestrator, alpha agents, risk agents, portfolio agents, backtest agents, execution agents, audit agents, and memory agent. We present two in-house trading examples. For the stock trading task (hourly data from 04/2024 to 12/2024), our approach achieved a return of 20.42%, a Sharpe ratio of 2.63, and a maximum drawdown of -3.59%, while the S&P 500 index yielded a return of 15.97%. For the BTC trading task (minute data from 27/07/2025 to 13/08/2025), our approach achieved a return of 8.39%, a Sharpe ratio of 0.38, and a maximum drawdown of -2.80%, whereas the BTC price increased by 3.80%. Our code is available on https://github.com/Open-Finance-Lab/AgenticTrading{GitHub}.

We study mean field portfolio games under Epstein-Zin preferences, which naturally encompass the classical time-additive power utility as a special case. In a general non-Markovian framework, we establish a uniqueness result by proving a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and the solutions to a class of BSDEs. A key ingredient in our approach is a necessary stochastic maximum principle tailored to Epstein-Zin utility and a nonlinear transformation. In the deterministic setting, we further derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equilibrium investment and consumption policies.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

Prediction markets allow users to trade on outcomes of real-world events, but are prone to fragmentation through overlapping questions, implicit equivalences, and hidden contradictions across markets. We present an agentic AI pipeline that autonomously (i) clusters markets into coherent topical groups using natural-language understanding over contract text and metadata, and (ii) identifies within-cluster market pairs whose resolved outcomes exhibit strong dependence, including same-outcome (correlated) and different-outcome (anti-correlated) relationships. Using a historical dataset of resolved markets on Polymarket, we evaluate the accuracy of the agent's relational predictions. We then translate discovered relationships into a simple trading strategy to quantify how these relationships map to actionable signals. Results show that agent-identified relationships achieve roughly 60-70% accuracy, and their induced trading strategies earn about 20% average returns over week-long horizons, highlighting the ability of agentic AI and large language models to uncover latent semantic structure in prediction markets.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

This paper introduces a novel approach to financial risk analysis that does not rely on traditional price and market data, instead using market news to model assets as distributions over a metric space of risk factors. By representing asset returns as integrals over the scalar field of these risk factors, we derive the covariance structure between asset returns. Utilizing encoder-only language models to embed this news data, we explore the relationships between asset return distributions through the concept of Energy Distance, establishing connections between distributional differences and excess returns co-movements. This data-agnostic approach provides new insights into portfolio diversification, risk management, and the construction of hedging strategies. Our findings have significant implications for both theoretical finance and practical risk management, offering a more robust framework for modelling complex financial systems without depending on conventional market data.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

In this paper, we present a general framework for the derivation of interesting finite combinatorial sums starting with certain classes of polynomial identities. The sums that can be derived involve products of binomial coefficients and also harmonic numbers and squared harmonic numbers. We apply the framework to discuss combinatorial sums associated with some prominent polynomial identities from the recent past.

Solving Mixed-Integer Programming (MIP) problems often requires substantial computational resources due to their combinatorial nature. Parallelization has emerged as a critical strategy to accelerate solution times and enhance scalability to tackle large, complex instances. This paper investigates the parallelization capabilities of Balans, a recently proposed multi-armed bandits-based adaptive large neighborhood search for MIPs. While Balans's modular architecture inherently supports parallel exploration of diverse parameter configurations, this potential has not been thoroughly examined. To address this gap, we introduce ParBalans, an extension that leverages both solver-level and algorithmic-level parallelism to improve performance on challenging MIP instances. Our experimental results demonstrate that ParBalans exhibits competitive performance compared to the state-of-the-art commercial solver Gurobi, particularly on hard optimization benchmarks.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

Forecasting is a task that is difficult to evaluate: the ground truth can only be known in the future. Recent work showing LLM forecasters rapidly approaching human-level performance begs the question: how can we benchmark and evaluate these forecasters instantaneously? Following the consistency check framework, we measure the performance of forecasters in terms of the consistency of their predictions on different logically-related questions. We propose a new, general consistency metric based on arbitrage: for example, if a forecasting AI illogically predicts that both the Democratic and Republican parties have 60% probability of winning the 2024 US presidential election, an arbitrageur can trade against the forecaster's predictions and make a profit. We build an automated evaluation system that generates a set of base questions, instantiates consistency checks from these questions, elicits the predictions of the forecaster, and measures the consistency of the predictions. We then build a standard, proper-scoring-rule forecasting benchmark, and show that our (instantaneous) consistency metrics correlate with LLM forecasters' ground truth Brier scores (which are only known in the future). We also release a consistency benchmark that resolves in 2028, providing a long-term evaluation tool for forecasting.

This position paper argues that agentic AI systems should be designed and evaluated as marginal token allocation economies rather than as text generators priced by the unit. We follow a single request -- a developer asking a coding agent to fix a failing test -- through four economic layers that today are designed in isolation: a router that decides which model answers, an agent that decides whether to plan, act, verify, or defer, a serving stack that decides how to produce each token, and a training pipeline that decides whether the trace is worth learning from. We show that all four layers are solving the same first-order condition -- marginal benefit equals marginal cost plus latency cost plus risk cost -- with different index sets and different prices. The framing is deliberately minimal: we do not propose a complete theory of AI economics. But adopting marginal token allocation as the shared accounting object explains why systems that locally minimize tokens globally misallocate them, predicts a small set of recurring failure modes (over-routing, over-delegation, under-verification, serving congestion, stale rollouts, cache misuse), and points to a concrete research agenda in token-aware evaluation, autonomy pricing, congestion-priced serving, and risk-adjusted RL budgeting.

Traditional Learning-To-Rank (LETOR) approaches, including pairwise methods like RankNet and LambdaMART, often fall short by solely focusing on pairwise comparisons, leading to sub-optimal global rankings. Conversely, deep learning based listwise methods, while aiming to optimise entire lists, require complex tuning and yield only marginal improvements over robust pairwise models. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Travelling Salesman Problem Rank (TSPRank), a hybrid pairwise-listwise ranking method. TSPRank reframes the ranking problem as a Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP), a well-known combinatorial optimisation challenge that has been extensively studied for its numerous solution algorithms and applications. This approach enables the modelling of pairwise relationships and leverages combinatorial optimisation to determine the listwise ranking. This approach can be directly integrated as an additional component into embeddings generated by existing backbone models to enhance ranking performance. Our extensive experiments across three backbone models on diverse tasks, including stock ranking, information retrieval, and historical events ordering, demonstrate that TSPRank significantly outperforms both pure pairwise and listwise methods. Our qualitative analysis reveals that TSPRank's main advantage over existing methods is its ability to harness global information better while ranking. TSPRank's robustness and superior performance across different domains highlight its potential as a versatile and effective LETOR solution.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

We develop a tractable identification approach for strategic network formation models with both strategic link interdependence and individual unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects). The key challenge is that endogenous network statistics (e.g. number of common friends) enter the link formation equation, while the mapping from model primitives to equilibrium network structure is generally intractable. Our approach sidesteps this difficulty using a ``bounding-by-c'' technique that treats endogenous covariates as random variables and exploits monotonicity restrictions to obtain identifying information. A central contribution is to develop a spectrum of fixed-effects handling strategies based on subnetwork configurations: tetrad-based restrictions that difference out all individual fixed effects, triad-based and weighted restrictions that combine ``difference-out'' and ``integrate-out'' steps by differencing out some fixed effects and profiling over the remainder conditional on observed characteristics, and general weighted cycle-based restrictions that unify these cases. We also provide point identification results. Preliminary simulations show that the approach can deliver informative bounds on the structural parameters.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

In this research, we have empirically investigated the key drivers affecting liquidity in equity markets. We illustrated how theoretical models, such as Kyle's model, of agents' interplay in the financial markets, are aligned with the phenomena observed in publicly available trades and quotes data. Specifically, we confirmed that for small signed order-flows, the price impact grows linearly with increase in the order-flow imbalance. We have, further, implemented a machine learning algorithm to forecast market impact given a signed order-flow. Our findings suggest that machine learning models can be used in estimation of financial variables; and predictive accuracy of such learning algorithms can surpass the performance of traditional statistical approaches. Understanding the determinants of price impact is crucial for several reasons. From a theoretical stance, modelling the impact provides a statistical measure of liquidity. Practitioners adopt impact models as a pre-trade tool to estimate expected transaction costs and optimize the execution of their strategies. This further serves as a post-trade valuation benchmark as suboptimal execution can significantly deteriorate a portfolio performance. More broadly, the price impact reflects the balance of liquidity across markets. This is of central importance to regulators as it provides an all-encompassing explanation of the correlation between market design and systemic risk, enabling regulators to design more stable and efficient markets.

We introduce the Polymarket-v1 Database: the complete on-chain trade archive of Polymarket's first-generation CTF Exchange on Polygon, spanning 2022-11-21 to 2026-04-28 and covering the full contract lifecycle from first settlement to natural termination. The dataset comprises 1.20 billion trade records across 1.30 million markets with $61 billion in nominal volume. Its defining feature is 100% ground-truth aggressor direction derived from the blockchain settlement layer, a property unavailable in existing prediction market archives, which rely on heuristic inference. We use this truth-aligned archive to benchmark standard microstructure tools and document three findings. First, the tick rule and bulk volume classification achieve near-random aggregate accuracy (49.83% and 50.51%), but this masks a systematic, correctable price-level gradient driven by positive trade direction autocorrelation and concentrated market-making -- two structural features of prediction markets that violate the mean-reversion assumption embedded in classical classifiers. Second, these classification errors propagate into downstream metrics: inferred VPIN diverges substantially from ground-truth VPIN, and OFI estimates are directionally biased, with material consequences for Transaction Cost Analysis. Third, ground-truth microstructure quality predicts forecasting performance in ways that classification-based proxies cannot recover: True VPIN positively predicts Brier scores, while Gibbs spread negatively predicts them -- a selection effect reflecting that high-spread niche markets attract informed specialists rather than noise traders. Replacing ground-truth metrics with classified proxies attenuates both relationships, illustrating that measurement accuracy at the transaction level is a prerequisite for reliable inference about prediction market design and probability calibration.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

We present a methodology to price options and portfolios of options on a gate-based quantum computer using amplitude estimation, an algorithm which provides a quadratic speedup compared to classical Monte Carlo methods. The options that we cover include vanilla options, multi-asset options and path-dependent options such as barrier options. We put an emphasis on the implementation of the quantum circuits required to build the input states and operators needed by amplitude estimation to price the different option types. Additionally, we show simulation results to highlight how the circuits that we implement price the different option contracts. Finally, we examine the performance of option pricing circuits on quantum hardware using the IBM Q Tokyo quantum device. We employ a simple, yet effective, error mitigation scheme that allows us to significantly reduce the errors arising from noisy two-qubit gates.

As with other commodities, markets could help us efficiently produce machine intelligence. We propose a market where intelligence is priced by other intelligence systems peer-to-peer across the internet. Peers rank each other by training neural networks which learn the value of their neighbors. Scores accumulate on a digital ledger where high ranking peers are monetarily rewarded with additional weight in the network. However, this form of peer-ranking is not resistant to collusion, which could disrupt the accuracy of the mechanism. The solution is a connectivity-based regularization which exponentially rewards trusted peers, making the system resistant to collusion of up to 50 percent of the network weight. The result is a collectively run intelligence market which continual produces newly trained models and pays contributors who create information theoretic value.

In Causal Bayesian Optimization (CBO), an agent intervenes on an unknown structural causal model to maximize a downstream reward variable. In this paper, we consider the generalization where other agents or external events also intervene on the system, which is key for enabling adaptiveness to non-stationarities such as weather changes, market forces, or adversaries. We formalize this generalization of CBO as Adversarial Causal Bayesian Optimization (ACBO) and introduce the first algorithm for ACBO with bounded regret: Causal Bayesian Optimization with Multiplicative Weights (CBO-MW). Our approach combines a classical online learning strategy with causal modeling of the rewards. To achieve this, it computes optimistic counterfactual reward estimates by propagating uncertainty through the causal graph. We derive regret bounds for CBO-MW that naturally depend on graph-related quantities. We further propose a scalable implementation for the case of combinatorial interventions and submodular rewards. Empirically, CBO-MW outperforms non-causal and non-adversarial Bayesian optimization methods on synthetic environments and environments based on real-word data. Our experiments include a realistic demonstration of how CBO-MW can be used to learn users' demand patterns in a shared mobility system and reposition vehicles in strategic areas.

We document stable cross-asset patterns in cryptocurrency limit-order-book microstructure: the same engineered order book and trade features exhibit remarkably similar predictive importance and SHAP dependence shapes across assets spanning an order of magnitude in market capitalization (BTC, LTC, ETC, ENJ, ROSE). The data covers Binance Futures perpetual contract order books and trades on 1-second frequency starting from January 1st, 2022 up to October 12th, 2025. Using a unified CatBoost modeling pipeline with a direction-aware GMADL objective and time-series cross validation, we show that feature rankings and partial effects are stable across assets despite heterogeneous liquidity and volatility. We connect these SHAP structures to microstructure theory (order flow imbalance, spread, and adverse selection) and validate tradability via a conservative top-of-book taker backtest as well as fixed depth maker backtest. Our primary novelty is a robustness analysis of a major flash crash, where the divergent performance of our taker and maker strategies empirically validates classic microstructure theories of adverse selection and highlights the systemic risks of algorithmic trading. Our results suggest a portable microstructure representation of short-horizon returns and motivate universal feature libraries for crypto markets.

Decentralized prediction markets (DePMs) allow open participation in event-based wagering without fully relying on centralized intermediaries. We review the history of DePMs which date back to 2011 and includes hundreds of proposals. Perhaps surprising, modern DePMs like Polymarket deviate materially from earlier designs like Truthcoin and Augur v1. We use our review to present a modular workflow comprising eight stages: underlying infrastructure, market topic, share structure and pricing, market initialization, trading, market resolution, settlement, and archiving. For each module, we enumerate the design variants, analyzing trade-offs around decentralization, expressiveness, and manipulation resistance. We also identify open problems for researchers interested in this ecosystem.

Many poker systems, whether created with heuristics or machine learning, rely on the probability of winning as a key input. However calculating the precise probability using combinatorics is an intractable problem, so instead we approximate it. Monte Carlo simulation is an effective technique that can be used to approximate the probability that a player will win and/or tie a hand. However, without the use of a memory-intensive lookup table or a supercomputer, it becomes infeasible to run millions of times when training an agent with self-play. To combat the space-time tradeoff, we use deep learning to approximate the probabilities obtained from the Monte Carlo simulation with high accuracy. The learned model proves to be a lightweight alternative to Monte Carlo simulation, which ultimately allows us to use the probabilities as inputs during self-play efficiently. The source code and optimized neural network can be found at https://github.com/brandinho/Poker-Probability-Approximation

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

Systemic financial risk refers to the simultaneous failure or destabilization of multiple financial institutions, often triggered by contagion mechanisms or common exposures to shocks. In this paper, we present a dynamical model of bank leverage (the ratio of asset holdings to equity) a quantity that both reflects and drives risk dynamics. We model how banks, constrained by Value-at-Risk (VaR) regulations, adjust their leverage in response to changes in the price of a single asset, assumed to be held in fixed proportion across banks. This leverage-targeting behavior introduces a procyclical feedback loop between asset prices and leverage. In the dynamics, this can manifest as logistic-like behavior with a rich bifurcation structure across model parameters. By analyzing these coupled dynamics in both isolated and interconnected bank models, we outline a framework for understanding how systemic risk can emerge from seemingly rational micro-level behavior.

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a powerful framework to optimize black-box expensive-to-evaluate functions via sequential interactions. In several important problems (e.g. drug discovery, circuit design, neural architecture search, etc.), though, such functions are defined over large combinatorial and unstructured spaces. This makes existing BO algorithms not feasible due to the intractable maximization of the acquisition function over these domains. To address this issue, we propose GameOpt, a novel game-theoretical approach to combinatorial BO. GameOpt establishes a cooperative game between the different optimization variables, and selects points that are game equilibria of an upper confidence bound acquisition function. These are stable configurations from which no variable has an incentive to deviate- analog to local optima in continuous domains. Crucially, this allows us to efficiently break down the complexity of the combinatorial domain into individual decision sets, making GameOpt scalable to large combinatorial spaces. We demonstrate the application of GameOpt to the challenging protein design problem and validate its performance on four real-world protein datasets. Each protein can take up to 20^{X} possible configurations, where X is the length of a protein, making standard BO methods infeasible. Instead, our approach iteratively selects informative protein configurations and very quickly discovers highly active protein variants compared to other baselines.

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an interest to deviate). In this paper, inspired by a practical application in the context of a decision support system for collaborative transportation in a Short Food Supply Chain (SFSC), we mainly focus on Traveling Salesman Games (TSGs), where the objective is to allocate the cost of a Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) with n locations and 1 depot to n players, each linked to exactly one of the locations. Given the computational complexity of computing an element of the core and the cost of a TSP, we study semicore allocations: a relaxation of the core that only requires that the subsets of size n -1 and of size 1 do not wish to deviate from the coalition. In the literature, instances of TSGs with empty cores and semicores are found. Hence, this paper first surveys the methods to approximate stability whenever the core is empty, such as the cost of stability (computing the minimum amount of money to subsidize the coalition with to attain stability) and the ε-core (which is a set of allocations that allow subsets of players to exceed their actual cost, but at most of a value of ε). We prove that these two solution

We present FinRL-X, a modular and deployment-consistent trading architecture that unifies data processing, strategy construction, backtesting, and broker execution under a weight-centric interface. While existing open-source platforms are often backtesting- or model-centric, they rarely provide system-level consistency between research evaluation and live deployment. FinRL-X addresses this gap through a composable strategy pipeline that integrates stock selection, portfolio allocation, timing, and portfolio-level risk overlays within a unified protocol. The framework supports both rule-based and AI-driven components, including reinforcement learning allocators and LLM-based sentiment signals, without altering downstream execution semantics. FinRL-X provides an extensible foundation for reproducible, end-to-end quantitative trading research and deployment. The official FinRL-X implementation is available at https://github.com/AI4Finance-Foundation/FinRL-Trading.

The study of hardest and easiest fitness landscapes is an active area of research. Recently, Kaufmann, Larcher, Lengler and Zou conjectured that for the self-adjusting (1,lambda)-EA, Adversarial Dynamic BinVal (ADBV) is the hardest dynamic monotone function to optimize. We introduce the function Switching Dynamic BinVal (SDBV) which coincides with ADBV whenever the number of remaining zeros in the search point is strictly less than n/2, where n denotes the dimension of the search space. We show, using a combinatorial argument, that for the (1+1)-EA with any mutation rate p in [0,1], SDBV is drift-minimizing among the class of dynamic monotone functions. Our construction provides the first explicit example of an instance of the partially-ordered evolutionary algorithm (PO-EA) model with parameterized pessimism introduced by Colin, Doerr and F\'erey, building on work of Jansen. We further show that the (1+1)-EA optimizes SDBV in Theta(n^{3/2}) generations. Our simulations demonstrate matching runtimes for both static and self-adjusting (1,lambda) and (1+lambda)-EA. We further show, using an example of fixed dimension, that drift-minimization does not equal maximal runtime.

We present a convolutional variational autoencoder for cryptocurrency implied-volatility surfaces, together with a deployable predictor that combines it with a quadratic smile re-fit through a deterministic per-tenor routing rule. Trained on 6,034 fully-filled hourly Binance Options surfaces of BTC and ETH spanning May-October 2023 and parameterised on a common 6 times 7 tenor-delta grid, the model attains a hidden-cell surface-completion RMSE in the 0.94-1.56 vol-point range across both markets and mask rates 10-50%. The hybrid predictor attains 0.83 vol points at 50% masking against 7.00 for the smile re-fit alone, an eightfold reduction obtained at no additional inference cost. Under structurally-correlated hole patterns that emulate the withdrawal of an entire tenor of strikes, the smile re-fit incurs 9.6-13.1 vol points of error while the learned model remains at 1.5-1.9, isolating a regime in which the generative model is the only viable predictor. Joint training on BTC and ETH improves the in-distribution model on both markets by 9-27% relative to the better-performing single-symbol counterpart, indicating a substantially shared vol-surface manifold across the two largest cryptocurrencies over the observation window. The hybrid is calendar- and butterfly-arbitrage-free at the listed strikes, a property that the parametric smile re-fit alone fails at high mask rates. The per-snapshot reconstruction error of the trained model flags the late-October ETF-anticipation rally and the August 17, 2023 flash crash as elevated-error periods without supervision. All training and evaluation infrastructure is released to support reproducible follow-on work.

Although machine learning tasks are highly sensitive to the quality of input data, relevant datasets can often be challenging for firms to acquire, especially when held privately by a variety of owners. For instance, if these owners are competitors in a downstream market, they may be reluctant to share information. Focusing on supervised learning for regression tasks, we develop a regression market to provide a monetary incentive for data sharing. Our mechanism adopts a Bayesian framework, allowing us to consider a more general class of regression tasks. We present a thorough exploration of the market properties, and show that similar proposals in literature expose the market agents to sizeable financial risks, which can be mitigated in our setup.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.